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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to determine the optimal amount
of Rorschach protocol data required for maximal accuracy in person
ality assessment when experience level of judges and degree of
pathology of the subjects are taken into account.

Confidence in

judgment as it relates to the same three factors was also examined.
One hundred forty-four judges, consisting of 36 untrained
undergraduates, 36 senior undergraduate psychology majors, 36
graduate clinical psychology students, and 36 Ph.D.’s who were
Fellows of the Society of Projective Techniques, or had indicated a
special interest in projective techniques in the APA Directory, were
used.
Six Rorschach tests were administered to persons represent
ing Normal, Neurotic and Psychotic states of mental health.

They

were selected on the basis of their life situations, treatment condi
tion, and results on the MMPI.
Case data was then divided into the following separate
increments:
1 -Basic Identifying Data (BID): age, sex, level of educa
tion, marital status, past and present treatment status,
and occupation.
2 - BID plus Free Association and the Location Sheet (FA
and Loc).
3 - BID, FA, Loc, and Scoring based upon FA (Sc).
4 - BID, FA, Loc and Inquiry (Inq).

5 - BID. FA, Inq, Loc and Scoring based upon FA and Inq
(Scor).
6

- BID, FA, Inq, Loc, Scor and Testing of the Limits.

Each judge received a packet containing only one of the
foregoing information conditions on a single case.

After consider

ing the data, a judge was required to delineate the protocol subject,
utilizing the California Q-sort as a descriptive device.

The .

criterion for each case consisted of a consensual CQ-sort obtained
from persons well acquainted with the subjects.
Confidence in judgment was expressed quantitatively In the
form of "percentage right," and subjectively in the form of selfevaluation of performance on a .5 point scale ranging from 5 for "Very
Well" to 1 for "Very Poorly."
It was found that;
1 - There was an inverse relationship between level of train
ing and judgmental accuracy, regardless of type of proto
col or amount of information available.
2 - Increased amounts of data resulted in decreased levels
of accuracy.
3 - BID used by itself was productive of more accuracy than
any of the Rorschach data conditions. It exceeded Total
Rorschach Data at the .01 level, and the FA/Inq combina
tion at the .05 level of significance.
4 - The best Rorschach data source for use with Normals and
Neurotics was the FA/Sc combination. Verbalization was
more crucial in the assessment of Psychotics and the FA
condition by itself was most productive for that level
of pathology.
5 - Psychotics could be discriminated from the Normals at the
.01 level, and they could be discriminated from the
Neurotics at the .05 level of significance. In general,
there was a positive relationship between accuracy and
the degree of pathology of the subject.

6

- Less trained judges were most accurate with Normal re
cords, and more trained judges were most accurate with
Psychotic records.

7 - There was positive relationship between training and the
tendency to over-estimate pathology of subjects.
8

- Confidence did not increase as the amount of data in
creased, and it did not alter with regard to type of
protocol.

9 - Most of the judges estimated their performances as being
Fair or average, and thus no difference in subjective
estimates of confidence was found. There was an inverse
relationship between the quantitative estimate of confid
ence and training, however. This difference appeared to
be a reflection of degree of sophistication in statistical
matters rather than differential confidence levels.
10 - Rorschach accuracy and Social Desirability of the subject
were related positively,
11 - Genotypic as well as phenotypic characteristics were
missed by the more trained judges.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
The capacity for accurate judgment of people and prediction
of behavior has probably always been a highly valued attribute.

The

judgment of Solomon for instance has been celebrated throughout re
corded times and his resolution of the mat'ernity dilemma is well
known.

How one becomes a great judge like a Solon or Pericles has

always been the subject of rumination for the layman as well as the
scientist.
First efforts to examine the nature of judgment on a formal
basis can be traced to the psychophysicists of the 19th century
(Boring, 1950).

Although early efforts of such pioneers as Fechner,

Wundt and Muller were confined to investigations of judgments of
relatively simple stimuli like light and sound, they were neverthe
less important because they demonstrated that complex psychological
processes could be discriminated scientifically.

They also dis

covered that judges varied in their ability to judge, and that all
judgmental ability reached a ceiling beyond which accuracy became
zero.
Man has always strived to push that ceiling higher and higher
in an attempt to extend his powers of prediction, in both domestic
and occupational life.

One can observe this trend in a John Doe who

"plays the horses" with a system, or in the case of Smith and Son
who conduct a survey to determine what age group should be appealed
to in order to market their new product successfully.
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By the 1930's professionals in the field of penal correction
had hit upon the use of base rates as an aid in predicting if a
candidate for parole might become subject to recidivism if released
from prison (Gough, 1962).

The method was simple and merely con

sisted of matching candidate with a comparison group of previously
released parolees, where the recidivism base rates had already been
computed by counting actual incidences of parole violation.

If it

were found the candidate appeared to belong to a group that had been
shown actuarially to have a high violation rate, the correction
officer would most likely recommend continued incarceration, based
upon the high probability of recidivism.
Some psychologists pointed out this mechanical process is de
humanizing and missed extenuating factors which would favor a decision
for parole.

Others obversely emphasized accuracy and economy that

the actuarial process afforded.

Lundberg (1941) attempted to recon

cile the two opposing factions by asserting that the clinician
generally utilized an actuarial approach even if there were no formal
use of base rate tables.

It was his contention that the experienced

clinician made accurate judgments by relying upon many cases that he
had seen previously, and had employed to form subjective, internalized
norms or base rates.
The issue went unattended for a number of years, except for a
few investigators who would occasionally attempt to compare accuracy
of clinical judgments and predictions with those now made possible
by a more sophisticated actuarial process, the regression technique
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(Sarbin, 1943).

The latter statistical method operated on the simple

principle that if three (or more) numerical values covaried in a
known fashion, then knowledge of all other values made possible an
extrapolation of what the last value must be (Edwards, 1958).

More

over, development of the high speed computer has made this a rapid
and attractive process, since it required little time of the clinician
investigator.

Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction
Approximately two dozen studies comparing clinical and act
uarial prediction had been completed by the 1950's when Meehl (1954)
"fired the shot" that is still resounding throughout the world of
clinical psychology today.

In a slim volume entitled, Clinical Versus

Statistical Prediction, he carefully examined all of the then known
studies comparing the two methods and concluded that if the clinician
was using actuarial techniques as Lundberg (1941) suggested, he was
doing a poor job, since clinical prediction could only rarely equal
the accuracy of actuarial prediction, and it never exceeded it.

This

was a rude awakening since most clinicians believed that an experi
enced practitioner could never be bested by a simple and automatic
mechanical process.

Consequently, Meehl (1957) advised that wherever

possible, the clinician should utilize a regression formula since it
does a better and more accurate job.
It was not very long before there were a number of rejoinders.
Zubin (1955) asserted there was no quarrel at all, because both tech
niques could and should be used in combination to exact the greatest
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possible advantage.

McArthur (1955) on the other hand justifiably

emphasized that the statistical approach was favored in the cited
studies, because clinicians were asked to use unfamiliar instruments
to make judgments about unfamiliar events.

His most important ob

servation was the fact that different data was usually employed for
the two types of prediction and hence they were not truly comparable
processes in most of the studies.

Most subsequent investigations

corrected for this valid criticism, but the clinician still tended
to run a disappointing second best (Hunt and Jones, 1962).
Perhaps the most cogent analysis of the situation was pre
sented by Holt (1958) in an article that stimulated hope that clini
cal procedures might still be properly vindicated.

He urged that a

minimum condition for any accurate clinical judgment would have to
include five basic steps in order for the clinician to demonstrate
his ability.

First there would have to be a job analysis or a process

of familiarization with that which must be evaluated.

Secondly, one

would have to know what intervening variable would need to be consid
ered if the behavior is to be predicted.

Next it would be necessary

to identify the appropriate data that could afford measures of the
intervening variables identified as relevant.

Fourth, one would have

to gather the data to give measures to the intervening variables, and
finally the data must be combined to yield a prediction.
Perhaps the most heuristic prescription advanced by Holt
(1958) in this article, which has become a landmark in the contro
versy, is that position that, "One kind of comparative study might
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teach us something even though it would be hard to do properly:
simultaneous attempts to predict the same criterion from the same
data by clinicians and statisticians who have gone through the same
preliminary steps. As the statistician studies the original group
to determine the critical scores for his multiple cutting point
formula (or whatever), the clinician will study the configurations
of these scores in individuals of known performance,"

In summary,

Holt suggested that clinicians need to become familiar with a task,
use the same data as the statistical method, and then he must be
given the benefit of feedback or knowledge of results concerning
his initial judgments.
The value of feedback has been well documented as a facili
tator of performance in a variety of learning situations (Woodworth
and Schlosberg, 1954),

Dailey (1952) demonstrated that clinical

judgments about case material became more accurate as feedback on
judgment was continued.

Fancher (1966) used the same case material

and obtained essentially the same results.

Whether or not adherence

to Holt's prescriptions enabled the clinician to exceed actuarial
prediction still remains to be demonstrated, however.

Sawyer (1966)

recently reviewed and analyzed 45 studies providing valid compari
sons of techniques and concluded that clinical predictions exceed
statistical predictions under some but still not all conditions.
Prior to 1965 investigators were able to show the value of
feedback for raising the level of accuracy of clinical judgment but
no one was able to present data where statistical accuracy was
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exceeded.

Goldberg (1959) showed students could exceed their teachers

in accuracy if they were told which predictors to use in differentiat
ing organic from non-organic Bender-Gestalt figure duplications, but
an untrained secretary was able to exceed both groups with the aid of
regression formulae,

Oskamp (1962) found the identification of valid

predictors helped, but did not cause judges to do better than a
formula in differentiating psychotic from non-psychotic MMPI profiles.
Similar results were obtained by Lee and Tucker (1962) and Newton
(1965).

Newton found that feedback on how well an instrument corre

lated with the criterion was more meaningful than mere reporting on
the subject's hit rate,

Sechrest et al, (1967) recently completed

three studies that all demonstrated the validity of feedback, but it
was discovered that feedback may be just as valuable as a source of
motivation as it is a source of information.
It was not until 1965 that it could be demonstrated, as Holt
(1958) had anticipated, that the clinician could exceed the formula
in accuracy, if prediction was made from the same data and feedback
was made available (Lindzey, 1965).

In a paper entitled, Seer Over

Sign, Lindzey discussed a two part study where clinicians were able
to identify TAT records of homosexuals with significantly greater
accuracy than an actuarial formula that was ineffective on crossvalidation.

Even Meehl (1965) acknowledged this as the first legiti

mate instance where clinical judgment exceeded statistical prediction.
Since that time two studies which reinforced this trend have appeared
in the current literature.

Imig (1967) found that 75% of his judges
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exceeded a regression formula in predicting college freshman failure,
and Strieker (1967) demonstrated that judges could exceed statistical
accuracy in identifying adolescent patient figure drawings if they
had the benefit of knowing what predictors to emphasize.
The clinical versus actuarial controversy is by no means re
solved.

Watley (1966, 1967a, 1967b) recently completed a series of

studies wherein the statistical procedure was found superior and
feedback in the mere form of hits and misses produced no improvements
at all.

What has been the upshot of all the controversy?

It's value

would seem to lie in the awakening of the realization in clinicians
that procedures must be examined and instruments and skills must be
sharpened wherever possible (Rotter, 1967).

By now, it is well

accepted that the most intelligent approach to clinical tasks would
be to utilize a combined approach (Thorne, 1960).

Where actuarial

techniques are not available one would still have to rely upon the
best clinical methods at our disposal (Meehl, 1957).

Since high speed

computers are not commonly available and cannot be brought into the
diagnostic or therapeutic treatment room, such occurrences will be
numerous.

Therefore, a vital need to identify the factors related

to accurate judgment and prediction still exists (Little, 1967).

Factors in Clinical Judgment and Prediction
The large body of data that has thus far been collected can
be profitably approached by an analysis of separate variables dis
covered to be relevant.

These are variables related to the nature of
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judge, subject, the process itself and lastly the material of the
judgment, the data source.

Judge Variables
Training and Experience
One of the most surprising and paradoxical findings of the
investigations has been the fact that untrained, inexperienced judges
were found to do as well as, or better than, experienced clinical psy
chologists in a variety of judging tasks.

Trained judges almost always

did significantly better than chance when predicting, but so did u n 
trained judges (Cline, 1955; Goldberg, 1959; Oskamp, 1962).

This find

ing was apparently so consistent Bieri e± al. (1966) claimed that "it
is hard to find studies where there have been systematic differences
between trained and untrained judges."

It is not hard to find such

studies (Sines, 1959; Grigg, 1960; Stelmachers and McHugh, 1964), but
the fact remains that although it would be expected professionals would
be consistently more accurate, they generally did not do better (Soskin,
1954; Goldberg, 1959; Horowitz, 1962; Grebstein, 1963), and in at least
four cases definitely were poorer (Luft, 1951; Weiss, 1963; Lindzey,
1965; Strieker, 1967).
Within this area however, results must be examined carefully
before they can be accepted.

In some cases investigators misuse the

term "clinician" and merely end up comparing two groups of inexperi
enced subjects (Cline and Richards, 1963).
that Sechrest _ej: a^.

Little (1967) pointed out

(1967) make generalizations about clinicians in

their study although it was based upon undergraduates who may not have
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been capable of even completing undergraduate school.

In such cases

it is questionable that the investigator is validly demonstrating
poorer clinical performance.
Another criticism involves the judgmental task that is
usually selected as the dependent variable.

In many instances a simpli

fied task, dichotomous in structure, is selected in order to make it
feasible to secure performances of the untrained.

The simplified task

is oftentimes artificial and unfamiliar to the clinician.

Moreover,

it does not allow the clinician to demonstrate high level skills,
because no provision is made for the expression of specific rather than
gross observations and judgments.

Under such conditions the untrained

subject is favored because he is only capable of gross observations
and is never required to perform at levels that may be unreachable for
him.
In the past the clinician had been able to demonstrate excel
lence, but only when data had been kept at a minimum and experience
alone could be relied upon to make performance superior (Luft, 1951;
Weiss, 1963).

He should be able to exhibit the effects of advanced

training providing the measured behavior involves complex tasks which
allow not gross, but highly qualified, job-related differentiations.

Confidence
In 1962, Oskamp discovered an interesting phenomenon concern
ing relationships between level of training, accuracy of judgment, and
confidence of the judge.

Students were almost always more sure than

experts of the correctness of their differential judgments involving
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patient and non-patient MMPI Profiles.

In addition, he discovered an

inverse relationship between confidence and judgmental accuracy.

This

finding has been duplicated in eleven different investigations employ
ing different instruments and data sources beginning in 1929 (Valentine)
to the present (Watley, 1966b).
Investigators have obtained conflicting results when investi
gating the relationship between confidence and amount of available data.
Oskamp (1965) observed confidence levels increased progressively as a
function of increased data, but in Gordon's (1966) study these results
were not secured.

Level of confidence remained the same whether

students had few or many projective test responses to make judgments.
Discrepancies between the two studies can probably be explained ade
quately by differences in the relationship between data provided and
the tasks.

Increased data altered confidence levels only when they

could in fact make some difference in the execution of the task.
Oskamp (1965) provided large and relevant increments in data, while
Gordon (1966) provided small, disconnected increments of two projective
responses per step.
Lastly, Watley (1967b) showed that the inverse relationship be
tween confidence and judgmental accuracy cannot be easily altered
even when feedback is involved.

Low accurate, high confident judges

were apprised of their limited accuracy in predicting college freshman
grade point averages, but they did not alter estimates of confidence
and did not increase accuracy when asked to predict again for a new
sample.
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The implications of the preceding sections are clear.

Train

ing and self-confidence were no guarantee of judgmental accuracy.
More experienced clinicians tended to be more conservative than novi
tiates, and therefore were more appropriate in the estimation of their
skills (Oskamp, 1962, 1965), but self-satisfaction in judgments appar
ently was not a dependable index of judgmental accuracy (Bieri, 1966).
In the last analysis expertness could be validly assumed only where
there had been verification of accuracy (Meehl, 1956b).

Even where

lack of expertness could be demonstrated, it appeared that it was diffi
cult to persuade clinicians to alter their self-evaluations and examine
their customary means of operating (Watley, 1967b).

Cognitive Style
Another factor which could effect judgmental accuracy is related
to the cognitive style or structure of the judge.

Sarbin ej: _al. (1960)

felt that judgment proceeded by a deductive thought process dependent
upon subjective categories qr^ classifications formulated on the basis
of past experiences.

Incoming data were matched with specific cate

gories, and once matched formed the basis of a clinical inference.
Therefore, cognitive structure would be a reference to "enduring patterns
of organization in the person's representation of the social and physical
environment" (Bieri et_ a_l., 1966).

Bieri (1955) and others have studied

what effects the level of cognitive complexity could have upon the
process of prediction.

One would postulate on an a priori basis that

added cognitive complexity of a judge would be more desirable because
it would presumably lead to finer discriminations and hence to higher
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accuracy, but results do not support this contention.
Bieri (1955) found that "complex" judges emphasized differ
ences while "simple" judges emphasized similarities between themselves
and subjects, so that judgmental accuracy depended on whether the sub
ject was in fact different from or similar to the judges.

Leventhal

(1957) examined the relationship between amount of data and complexity
of judges.

Judges were more accurate with less data if they were

"cognitively complex," but they became confused with added inputs and
their accuracy was reduced below that of "cognitively simple" judges.
Fancher (1966) divided a group of Harvard students along the
complexity dimension and found that high and low complexity judges
were more accurate in predicting behavior from case material when com
pared to medium complex judges.

A complete account of current research

on cognitive style can be obtained by referring to Sarbin et al. (1960)
and Bieri et al. (1966), but studies to this point do not provide
final evidence as to the importance of cognitive style in the judgmen
tal process.

Personality
It is known, however, that some judges in every study demon
strated high levels of accuracy on a consistent basis.

Others have

consistently demonstrated low levels of accuracy and it has been sensibly
urged that a careful study of each group of judges will aid in discover
ing what traits are valuable for accurate clinical judgment (Meehl,
1954a; Thorne, 1960; Watley, 1966a).
view on the subject pointed out;

Taft (1955) in the initial re
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The contradictions found between studies may be due partly to
low reliability of the measures used, and partly to the effect
of specific factors such as type of judgment required, the traits
being judged, and the subjects used. This problem of specificity
arises with all traits, but it seems to be particularly marked in
the case of the ability to judge others. . . .
Despite continued difficulties, a number of reliable traits relating to
ability to predict have been isolated.
Judges who showed highly accurate predictions have been observed
to possess high intellectual ability (Cline, 1955; Taft, 1955), a
capacity for abstraction (Kelly and Fiske, 1951; Cline, 1955; Watley,
1966a), and orderliness (Watley, 1966a; Van Atta, 1966), but not to
extreme lengths (Baker and Block, 1957).

They can tolerate disorder

(Van Atta, 1966), are ambitious and achieve scholastically (Tomlinson,
1967), but do not overestimate their capacities (Oskamp, 1962, 1965)
and even tend to be exhibitionistic (Tomlinson, 1967), but they possess
a sensitivity to the generalized other (Taft, 1955) and in their inter
personal behavior seem to be empathic (Fancher, 1966) while at the same
time are found to be objective and non-judgmental (Fancher, 1967).
High accurate judges tend to be free of ethnocentrism and authoritar
ianism (Cline, 1955), and seem to be moderately dogmatic (Weingold,
1967).
Taft (1955) emphasized the importance of motivation for high
accuracy, and Sechrest ^t al. (1967) also stressed this element in
three recent studies.

These results would appear consistent with

Gordon's (1966) findings that high ego involvement leads to high
accuracy.

Insight into one's own personality (Mueller, 1963) and

that of one's peers (Taft, 1955) were also helpful, but must be
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accompanied by good social adjustment (Taft, 1955; Watley, 1966a) in
order to be efficacious.

Age was found a factor for children, but not

for adults in accurate person perception (Taft, 1955).

Females appeared

to be better judges (Taft, 1955), but recent research (Tomlinson, 1967)
reported no significant differences for sex, and therefore, this dimen
sion is still in need of verification.'

General Ability
Whether or not the high accurate judge would have the capacity
to predict accurately in all situations has remained unverified also,
and it is not known if there are people who possess general factors for
judging.

Common sense experience would seem to indicate the affirma

tive, but research to date has not supported such a contention.
Holsopple and Phelan (1954) observed that judges were able to
match a variety of separate test protocols such as the Rorschach test,
the TAT, the Kuder, etc., with case data on a consistently high or low
level or range of performance.

Cline and Richards (1960) also found

' that judges were able to evaluate filmed interview data in a consis
tent fashion, and like the previously mentioned researchers concluded
that a general factor for judging must exist.

Fancher (1966) believed

that he was observing a general factor when he noted a general level
of excellence in predicting behavior from case history data.

Since

all of the foregoing studies have examined the judgmental process in
regard to only a single type of task it seems valid to conclude that
not all tasks will be accomplished with equal accuracy.
In order to assess a general factor one would have to identify
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high and low accurate judges and demonstrate consistent performance
across different types of tasks (i.e., absolute, differential, match
ing, configurational, etc.) with different types of data and material
(i.e., objective, projective, case, observational, etc.).

No such

definitive study has been executed, but Goldberg and Werts (1966) have
come closest to the ideal using Campbell and Fiske's Multitraitmultimethod approach.

They have shown that intra-judge reliability

for a trait rating is low when a judge uses a variety of instruments
like the Rorschach Test, MMPI, and WAIS.

They have also shown that

the ability to judge a trait is directly related and dependent upon
the instrument that was employed and also the type of trait that was
being examined.

Crow and Hammond came to the same conclusions in 1957.

The question of a general factor for judging remains unanswered and
awaits further research findings.

Subject Related Variables
Much less evidence has been accumulated pertaining to effects
that the object of the judgment has upon the judgmental process.
Schafer (1954) has stressed the need to explore the influence of
direct interpersonal contact upon psychometric judgmental processes.
Baer (1950) has shown that the patient may be affected by his own
dynamics in responding to the examiner, and Thorne (1960) warned that
the subject may arouse powerful feelings of transference within the
therapist, making him prone to numerous errors of judgment.

Yet very

little has been done to examine the significance of object variables.
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Personality
One of the earliest conceptualizations in the research litera
ture was the realization that high accuracy was attained when the
subject resembled or was similar to the judge (Taft, 1955; Gage and
Cronbach, 1955).

Dymond showed (1953) that a subject could also be

dissimilar and judgmental accuracy would still be high, provided the
subject was markedly and obviously different.

These results have since

been verified by Stelmachers and McHugh (1964) so that this factor
appears to be stable.
Subjects who were conformists and wished to present themselves
in a favorable light (Baker and Block, 1957) could be appraised
accurately.

Rigid individuals who were observed and judged to over

controlling by psychologists were also found highly predictable (Baker
and Block, 1957).

Mueller (1963) showed that insight level was re

lated to person perception.

Responses of subjects on Horney's Activity

Index were predicted accurately if they had high levels of insight.
Beyond these few facts little was known about the personality of the
subject and its effect upon judgmental accuracy.

Since personality of

the subject appears to be influential, more investigation and research
is needed in this area.

Diagnosis and Pathology
The study of pathology of the object to be judged has been sub
ject to the same neglect and this may be due to the difficulties
inherent in employing a diagnostic category as a criterion measure.
Ash (1949) warned about using diagnostic labels as criteria for research
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when he showed there was only 31.4 to 43.57, agreement in specific
diagnostic categories between expert psychiatrists.

Agreement was

higher, 57.9 to 67.470, when categories were made broad, but results
were still considered disappointing.
Schmidt and Fonda (1952) pointed out that lack of reliability
may have been due to the utilization of unofficial, unfamiliar classi
fications.

They replicated Ash's study with the approved, Standardized

American Psychiatric Association Nomenclature and obtained acceptable
results (an R ranging from .73 to .95) for three major categories,
characterological, organic and psychotic.

However, agreement was

significantly reduced when subtypes of disorders were diagnosed, and
it vanished almost completely when agreement was required for the Per
sonality Pattern and Trait Disorders classifications.
Zigler and Philips (1961) in an excellent review on the problem
of diagnosis and its current status, reached an apparently reliable
conclusion; diagnosis can be accurate on a broad, but not a narrow
basis.
useful.

When broad categories are employed they can be reliable and
Watkins and Stauffacher (1957) found that degrees of pathology

could be detected by means of the Rorschach Test.

Judges were able to

differentiate psychotics from normals and neurotics just on the basis
of their verbal behavior and deviant thought patterns.

This could be

accomplished even by naive judges, since schizophrenic patients could
be identified solely on the basis of taped excerpts (Cohen, 1960).
Lastly, Shontz (1956) advocated that diagnoses could be made specific
if a quantitative method was used, since he was able to obtain agreement
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on Normal and Hospitalized patient stereotypes (Rs of .68 and .59
respectively) when a Q-sort method was used as a medium of common ex
pression.

Kostlan (1954) and others have indicated that different

forms of pathology are difficult to judge or predict, and these studies
show conclusively they can be approached profitably by a broad attack,
and also assessed for effects they can have upon the clinical process.

Process Related Variables
Probably the most researched area of prediction has been the
process and method of judgment itself.

The need to delineate and

understand the significant influences of procedure was recognized early
(Sarbin, 1943; Meehl, 1959a; McArthur, 1955), and a number of models
have been proposed to aid in the study of the process, but no single
system has been proven significantly heuristic or outstanding.
Sarbin et_ al. (1960) advanced a cognitive hypothetico-deductive
system; Meehl (1954a) and Hoffman (1960) prefer a mathematical-configura
tional analogue.

Bieri jajt aJ. (1966) and Attneave (1959) used an infor

mation theory approach, while Hammond _et al, (1964) recommended a
representative design based on Brunswik's Lens Model scheme.

Hunt and

Jones (1962) did not subscribe to any specific school of theory, but
they urged the study of judgment via a carefully controlled psychophysi
cal paradigm.

The most practical results seem to have been obtained

by disregarding theoretical- biases and constructing relevant, but care
ful research designed to investigate specific factors.
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Stereotyping
It is known that judges use stereotypes as guides when they
judge subject behavior, and the more accurate the stereotype the
greater is found the accuracy of behavior prediction.

According to

English and English (1958), a stereotype is "a relatively rigid and
oversimplified or biased perception or conception of an aspect of
reality, especially of persons or social groups. . . . "

Although

they described the stereotype as possessing a negative aspect because
it is rigid or biased, it appeared that this element of stability be
came positive for the judgmental process, because it afforded a
reliable background, foundation or informal base rate on which others
could be accurately perceived with a minimum of data (Kostlan, 1954;
Sines, 1959; Soskin, 1959).
The stereotype used depends largely upon the object to be
judged and therefore is potentially variable, but the most common
method involved comparing the subject with one's own self-image or
self-stereotype (Dymond, 1953).

Stelmachers and McHugh (1964) com

pared the efficacy of employing three different stereotypes, Normal,
Socially Desirable and the Self Stereotypes,

They found that the

self stereotype was most useful for it provided a clear basis for com
parison and permitted assessment by means of an assumed similarity or
dissimilarity.
The process can be a powerful aid so that judges who had only
identifying data could make predictions as accurately as those made by
judges who viewed sound film interviews, if they utilized accurate
stereotypes (Geertsma and Stoller, I960).

The dimension of assumed
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similarity is such a useful springboard that Taft (1955) cautioned
about neglecting to account for its effect in interpreting the results
of early research.

He felt that one possible explanation for the poor

results of clinicians was the fact that untrained judges could correctly
rely upon assumed similarity since they belonged to the same age group,
but the older Ph.D.'s did not have the same advantage.
Stereotypes have been shown to be reliable and resistant to
alteration over time (Crow and Hammond, 1957), and since they did make
large contributions to the clinical process deserve study in and of
themselves.

However, the capacity to predict accurately depends upon

more than just stereotyping ability.

When students were called upon

to make predictions about a variety of subject behaviors after seeing
sound color film interviews, and the results were factor analyzed to
partial out the effect of stereotyping ability (Cline and Richards,
1960), it was found that accuracy in prediction depended upon two
factors, sensitivity to the generalized other and interpersonal accur
acy,

This could be designated Stereotype Accuracy and Differential

Accuracy.
Gage and Cronbach (1955) pointed out as a consequence of the
two factors a measure of accuracy is meaningless unless the prediction
was analyzed for stereotyping accuracy and true or differential accur
acy.

Differential accuracy would then be a measure of how well a

judge was able to assess unique traits or characteristics that were
attributable to significant individual differences rather than to
mere group membership.

Borke and Fiske (1957) in effect showed that
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differential perception made a contribution since patient contact
raised levels of accuracy beyond that attained on the basis of no con
tact and just stereotyped judgment.
Both influences deserved further study.

If the stereotype is

withdrawn as a judgmental aid, by increasing sensitivity to individual
differences, a marked reduction in accuracy occurred (Grow, 1957).
Therefore, it would seem that a combination of the two approaches
would be profitable, as Stelmachers and McHugh (1964) did in fact find
that accurate assessment of psychotics could be established by apply
ing a Normal Stereotype as a guideline and then determining what were
specific areas of deviation.

Premature Conclusions
Another important variable in the process of judgment was the
clinician's tendency to form hasty and premature conclusions with
little supporting evidence (McArthur, 1954).

It has been well estab

lished in at least ten different investigations that judges formed
conclusions on insufficient evidence (Kostlan, 1954), became locked
in (Bieri, 1962) and then practically ignored subsequent incoming data
(Dailey, 1952; Parker, 1958).

The tendency became so rigid that

Brieland (1959) was able to predict judge's evaluations of parents on
the latter part of a two part interview by an estimation of their first
impressions on the first part of the interview.

Similar findings have

been obtained with a variety of materials including psychometric data
(Oskamp, 1962), case data (Parker, 1958) or interview data (Van Atta,
1966).
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As would be expected those clinicians that formed premature
hypotheses or conclusions had low rates of accuracy (Van Atta, 1966).
This was probably because they heightened the chance of forming
incorrect conceptualizations (Sarbin e£ al., 1960) and stressed
invalid predictors (Hammond ej: al., 1964; Watley, 1966a),

Experi

enced clinicians seemed to be more prone to haste than inexperienced
judges because they tended to use past experiences as a justification
for risk-taking, despite an absence of any empirical support for sub
jective convictions (Thorne, 1960).

They were willing to take great

leaps from the data (McArthur, 1954), thereby taking greater risks
(Sarbin ej: al,, 1960) and consequently reduced their accuracy.

The

experienced clinician who was accurate seemed to proceed by forming a
fluid conceptualization that was altered as data was received, so
that a final personality assessment was based upon all of the incom
ing data (Van Atta, 1966).

Inference and the Formation of Models
Just what principles governed the construction of personality
formulations which were related to the process of inference and pre
diction are still unknown and are largely confined to theoretical
rumination rather than experimental manipulation,

Sarbin ej: al,

(1960) have presented an ingenious cognitive deductive scheme involv
ing the matching of data with subjective categories and classifica
tions that are inter-related.

According to them inference is a

syllogistic process wherein the data on hand become the bases of the
premises, and the final prediction is tantamount to the logical
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conclusion,
McArthur (1954) described the judgmental process as a continual
elaboration based upon initial bursts of insight.

As more data was

received conceptualization proceeded from a broad, vague approximation
about behavior to a finely elaborated, highly articulated and complete
model of personality.

The findings of Hebb (1949) and Piaget (1954)

would seem to be consistent with and lend credence to a process of
continual differentiation or "emergent synthesis" (Sundberg and Tyler,
1962).

After the synthesis, data would be collected from all sources

and analyzed from a number of different aspects to form an integrated,
implicit theory of personality and behavior.

The implicit theory

would then provide a frame of reference for most subsequent person
perception and judgment (Thorne, 1960).

Thorne (1960) believed that

inductive reasoning was employed for the classification process once
the implicit model was crystallized, but since there was no evidence
to the contrary, the inferential process could be carried out by
deductive or inductive reasoning, or a combination of the two.
Research has been completed on the nature of the judge's
conceptual model.

It is known for instance that people who are under

controlled make inaccurate predictions, because they lacked conceptual
frames of reference with which to process interpersonal data (Baker and
Block, 1957).

Over-controlled judges may have appropriate personality

schemes but their high anxiety levels prevented sensitivity to incom
ing data and accuracy was reduced because vital cues were never
processed.

Weingold (1967) has obtained results consistent with the
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foregoing, because he has discovered that low dogmatic judges (like
the under-controlled judges above) make poor predictions and so do the
judges found to be high dogmatic (like the over-controlled judges
above) when dealing with case material.

In addition to filtering out

or ignoring relevant material, it was possible that overcontrolledhigh dogmatic judges possess rigid and unyielding models of person^
ality that were applied inappropriately even when confronted with
negative feedback (Watley, 1967b).
It might be postulated on an a priori basis that a highly dif
ferentiated conceptual model would allow for greater specificity and
therefore greater accuracy, but Parker (1958) investigated this
variable and found no relationship between accuracy and the richness
of the implicit theory possessed by the judge.

It is known that

models based upon Idiosyncratic categories or classifications were
possessed more often by low accurate rather than by high accurate
judges (Van Atta, 1966).

Greater agreement on important personality

categories was noted among accurate predictors.

The type of concep

tual approach that was used does not seem to have an effect on
accuracy.

Mathematical or verbal orientations were equally produc

tive, providing nomothetic data were available for the first tech
nique and idiographic inputs were available for the other (Fancher,
1966).
Originally it was hypothesized that incoming data were
processed on a configurational basis where observations were consid
ered on a continual comparative basis (Meehl, 1959a).

However,

recent research seemed to indicate that an accurate judge processed
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data most efficiently on a linear, additive basis, giving weights to
each piece of information in the form of subjective probabilities
(Peterson and Beach, 1967), until the last piece of data was received
and a final conclusion was formulated (Grebstein, 1963; Hammond et^
al,, 1964; Van Atta, 1966).
In conclusion, the judgmental process appears to be based
upon an evaluation executed by means of an implicit, conceptual model
or theory of personality.

The model may be simple or highly complex,

but failure to develop a framework for judgment at all produces low
interpersonal predictive accuracy.

Processing of incoming data may

be accomplished with inductive or deductive reasoning or both, by
means of a linear, additive method.

Miscellaneous Process Factors
There are a number of other relevant factors that effect the
process of judgment.

Sines (1959) has reported a primacy rather

than a recency factor when judging, and data seen at the beginning
of a battery were more influential than data seen later in the
battery.

Time was an influential factor.

Judges tended to become

much less reliable when they were given unlimited time to work over
data (Huff and Friedman, 1967).

Fatigue may be operant under such

conditions, for Cummings (1954) found that judges became less accurate
when rating the last cards of the Rorschach Test for an adjustmentmaladjustment factor.
A good deal of work has been done on "anchoring" and its re
lationship to prediction and judgment.

Anchoring is a process whereby
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a perceptual response is determined not merely by the properties of
the objects or data themselves but by a frame of reference provided
by the judge on the basis of prior experience, bias, or in the case
of primacy, by what has immediately preceded the object.

The litera

ture on anchoring and adaptation levels is extensive, and is men
tioned only to point out that these factors are operant in shaping
clinical decisions.
and Tripodi (1967)

A review on this area has been provided by Miller
(for an account of the basic, relevant studies).

Data Related Variables
Two major aspects of the incoming data must be considered at
length next, because they are vital to both the theoretical and
applied clinicians.

Research has uncovered astonishing paradoxes

lative to amount and type of data needed to be employed for valid

re
con

clusions and predictions.

Amount of Data
All training from grade school on has made the assumption that
our decisions will be wise if we know all pertinent information and
"get all the facts."

Contrary to popular belief, it is well estab

lished by now that an abundance of data may not only be unnecessary,
but it may produce confusion or inaccuracy (Bartlett et a_l., 1966).
%

Most studies investigating the contribution of varying amounts of
information proceeded by means of an incremental design.
(1954) investigation was one of the first such
in its arrangement.

Kostlan's

studies and was classic

His procedure required 20 psychologists to
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complete 283 true and false items based upon an exposure to all possi
ble additive combinations of four data sources, the Rorschach Test,
the Stein Incomplete Sentence Test, the MMPI, and social case data.
Results were crucial and disillusioning.

Minimal data (basic identi

fying data, hereafter designated BID) permitted inferences with better
than chance accuracy when used in isolation from the other sources.
Social case history was the most helpful data source, for accuracy
without it was reduced to that attainable with only BID, even if all
three test data sources were used.

Studies like this one show that

some data sources are more important than others, and testing proce
dures should be carefully examined to discover why that should be true.
The present study is partially motivated by the remarkable results
obtained by Kostlan, particularly since he found that the Rorschach
test was the least helpful or valid in the judgment process.
Results of the Kostlan (1954) study should not have been a
surprise to the much informed clinicians, since Kelly and Fiske
(1951) had found earlier that predictions based on a credential file
plus an objective test profile for psychology trainees could be just
as valuable as judgments based on the foregoing materials plus projec
tive techniques, interviews and situation tests.

Soskin (1954, 1959),

Sines (1959), Lee and Tucker (1962) and Weiss (1963) have replicated
Kostlan's results with a variety of other types of data sources which
included comparisons of objective, projective, interview and minimal
data.

Bartlett e_t a_l, (1966) have also shown that accuracy was reduced

when judges predicted grade point averages from four predictors and
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were subsequently given 18 additional sources for consideration.
It is noteworthy, that Bartlett's study gave atypical results
for Borke and Fiske (1957), Leventhal (1957), Horowitz (1962) and
Stelmachers and McHugh (1964) by contrast have found that adding data
increases rather than decreases accuracy.

Unfortunately, additional

data very rarely raised predictive accuracy beyond that obtained on
the basis of different types of minimal data.

Type;

Non-psychometric
Generally, it has been reported two types of minimal data have

accounted for the bulk of judgmental accuracy, basic identifying data
and social case data.

These two data sources will be considered first

and then the remaining types of clinical data (the interview, projec
tive and objective test data) will be evaluated,

Basic Identifying Data (BID).--The list of investigators who
have discovered the superiority of BID such as age, sex, occupation,
level of education, marital status etc., is long (Kelly and Fiske,
—

1951; Dailey, 1952; Soskin, 1954; Holsopple and Phelan, 1954; Winch
and More, 1956; Hathaway, 1956; Sines, 1959; Cline and Richards, 1960;
Horowitz, 1962; Lee and Tucker, 1962; Weiss, 1963) and does not have
to be fully elaborated herein.

It may be that BID is significant be

cause it provided all the clues that were necessary to formulate a
stereotype that acted as a powerful judgmental guide.
(1955)

Cronbach

suggested directly that the judge is safest when judging from

minimal data if he treats all subjects as though they were nearly
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like each other, or by evoking an image of the average individual.
Soskin (1954), Geertsma and Stoller (1960) and Oskamp (1965) stated
that their judges were able to do well, seemingly because they evoked
accurate stereotypes on the basis of just limited identifying data.

Social Case Data.

On the other hand, several investigators

have found that case data played a more prominent role.

As mentioned

above, Kostlan (1954) found BID significantly useful, but case data
was indispensable in raising accuracy significantly higher.

Little

and Shneidman (1959) employed an extensive battery of data sources
and estimated that anamnestic data was the most useful of all the data
sources, including the MMPI and the Rorschach Test, and could account
for all of the obtained accuracy by itself.

Soskin (1959) and Miller

and Bieri (1963) also reported the efficacy of case data, but made no
comparisons with BID.

Concerning case or anamnestic data, Winch and

More (1956) found that biographical data added significant increments
to predictive accuracy with three different types of progressively more
structured interviews.

However, King (1952) had shown that added case

data can reduce reliability and accuracy if it was irrelevant to the
task.
Whether BID or case data was superior is an academic issue,
since the acquisition of either is dependent upon practical factors
such as time and money available, and wherever possible the clinician
usually obtains both basic identifying data (at least from charts) and
complete anamnestic history from the patient in a direct interview
(Thorne, 1960).
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Interviews.--Since the interview has played a key role in the
clinical process, it has received considerable experimental analysis.
In 1951, Luft reported that judges could predict a subject's responses
to a multiple choice objective test on

the basis of reading a tran

script of an interview, almost as well

as when they had the benefit

hearing a tape of the interview,

of

Luft concluded, "The voice in spon

taneous speech tends to externalize significant underlying aspects of
the personality which may not be apparent in the content of speech."
Stated differently, the interviewer who wished to tap underlying
dynamic processes was handicapped if he had to rely on a secondary
source even if verbatim account.
Results of Borke and Fiske (1957) are difficult to interpret
in relation to those obtained by Luft (1951),

They reported that

judges could predict a subject's Q-sort on 100 Murray needs or a pic
ture preference sort task equally well

if based upon direct interview

ing, observing an interview, hearing the interview,
the interview.

or just reading

It may be that Luft's projective test tapped deeper

levels of the subject's personality than that which was reached by
the sorting tasks described above.

Results for the more objective

tasks were highly consistent, and have been replicated by Giedt (1955)
with sound film interviews, by Sperber and Alderstein who compared
(1961)

taped versus transcribed interviews for IQ estimates, and

Tomlinson (1967) who investigated direct versus indirect interviews
(seen through a two-way mirror).
It appeared that interview data was generally useful regard
less of method of acquisition.

Only Grigg (I960) discovered a
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condition to be assiduously avoided.

Actual taped, re-enacted, and

transcribed interview materials were compared as sources for predic
tions about a subject's responses to the Adjective Check List and Self
Q-Sort tasks.

The re-enacted interview was the least valid source of

data and resulted in the lowest rates of accuracy.

Most clinicians

rarely encounter simulated interviews, but this is a variable operant
in Psychodrama and many experimental conditions, and has to be taken
into consideration when results are interpreted.

Type: Psychometric
Researchers have produced evidence indicating that the bulk
of judgmental accuracy can be attributed to BID or case data should
serve as an alarm for the conscientious clinician and must motivate
him to evaluate and analyze the empirical contributions of test proce
dures.

We have some knowledge about how our most frequently used

instruments are related to predictive accuracy.
The Rorschach Test was inferior as a predictor when compared
with other well known test procedures in studies conducted by Kelly
and Fiske (1951), Kostlan, (1954), Soskin (1959), Little and
Shneidman (1959), Sines (1959), and Howard (1962).

Kostlan (1954)

not only found that the Rorschach was least valid when compared to
the MMPI, BID or case history, but he and Soskin (1954, 1959) reported
that judges emphasized maladjustment and changed previously accurate
predictions when Rorschach data was introduced.

These are serious

indictments when it is considered that the Rorschach Test is the most
used test technique in mental health facilities throughout the nation
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(Sundberg, 1961).

Wildman and Wildman (1967) reported that clini

cians relied upon it more than any other test when time was limited
and a concise battery was indicated.

The MMPI has given statistically

more valid results, but it too falls short of being more serviceable
than BID (Kostlan, 1954; Sines, 1954; Little and Shneidman, 1955).
These results taken on face value have been misleading, and
they must be examined closely before they can be understood and
validly interpreted.

Practically all of these investigations were

equally fallible in that the judge was usually forced to utilize
Rorschach and other data in an unusual, unfamiliar, inappropriate
manner.

McArthur (1955) and Holt (1958) both warned that the clini

cian will never do well if he is not allowed to use a familiar instru
ment in a preferred manner and yet Kostlan (1954) required anticipation
of patient responses to a true and false task, both activities being
foreign to the clinician.

Howard (1962) required rating of 10 little

used Murray Needs, although Borke and Fiske (1957) showed that a lack
of familiarity with a task significantly effected results.

By con

trast, the Rorschach is often used to estimate IQ in practice, and
judges asked to perform this familiar task have been observed to be
quite successful according to Todd (1954), Bialik and Hamlin (1954)
and Grebstein (1963).
Inaccuracy may also be due to the fact that the Rorschach Test
may best tap the pathological or deepest, less ego-organized aspects
of personality (Stone and Dellis, 1960).

Soskin (1954) reported that

the Rorschach was highly successful in detecting negative traits
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overlooked during interviews, which were more productive in isolating
positive traits.

It seems more and more likely low levels of agree

ment between the Rorschach and other tests may be due to the fact that
our instruments do indeed tap different elements during personality
assessment and inter-test reliability should therefore not be highly
probable.

Little and Shneidman (1955) were disappointed to find low

reliability in inter-test judgments, but recently it was shown that
they may have missed meaningful results by not evaluating how well
judges agreed on specific traits on an intra-test basis.

Goldberg

and Werts (1966) had judges rate four traits from four different
sources of data, vocational history, Rorschach Test, MMPI and the WAIS.
They also found little inter-test agreement, but did find reliability
on an intra-test basis.
Discovery of low reliability may reflect the fact that our
tests do not overlap, rather than a lack of dependability.

Poor ex

perimental design is another influential factor that oftentimes con
taminates results and masks any validity the Rorschach can demonstrate.
As an example, lack of control for position effect is blatant in a
number of studies.

Howard (1962) claimed the Rorschach was the least

useful rating device when compared to the Stein Sentence Completion
Test and the TAT, but he never considered the significance of requir
ing judgments with the Rorschach when it had always been preceded by
the total battery.

Winch and More (1956) committed the same position

error in reference to the TAT and invalidly concluded it contributed
no additional information or increase in predictive validity.
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Lastly, Hamlin pointed out the Rorschach made a poor showing
in many investigations because it cannot be utilized to predict global
measures from atomistic data and this shortcoming as practiced re
sulted inevitably in unreliable and invalid performances (Cummings,
1954).

If research is designed to demonstrate the true utility of

the Rorschach Test in the clinical process, the results cannot be
valid unless measures are taken to insure that the dependent variable
is truly a clinically appropriate task, is familiar, and is complex
enough to allow for the expression of qualitative differences.

Judges

utilized must be clinicians, and the experimental design must be highly
controlled to eliminate contaminating factors that confound results.

Output Data;

The Q-sort

Stephenson (1953), Meehl (1960) and Bieri (1966) all advocated
the Q-sort method as an ideal output or dependent variable for projec
tive test and personality research.

It allows a highly qualitative

assessment of individual personality on a quantitative, ipsative basis
that is conducive to powerful parametric statistical analysis (Meehl,
1959b).
Q-technique is simple, making it an ideal instrument to use
with a variety of populations, including the layman.

A subject is

asked to arrange (sort) a group of descriptive statements (a deck) to
describe events, entities or objects.

Cards containing the items are

usually arranged along a continuum ranging from "most like" or "least
like," and therefore the technique is nothing more than a sophisti
cated rank-order procedure.

Q-items or descriptive statements may
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consist of theoretical statements or personality traits, and they are
selected as being directly related to whatever the investigator is
studying.

Stephenson pioneered the method (Kerlinger, 1964), and

demonstrated it very well in an evaluation of Jungian theory
(Stephenson, 1953).

Butler and Haigh (1954) used personality traits

in examining possible changes in self-concept, but Q-decks have been
constructed to study a variety phenomena including attitude toward
work (Neff, 1963), types of stereotypes (Beck, 1954; Rubin and Shontz,
1960), family concepts (Van der Veen, 1965), personality profiles
(Block, 1961), and a deck devoted to the study of development is cur
rently being devised (Block, 1961).
In selecting items Goodling and Guthrie (1956) suggested that
items should be chosen that give neither strong negative nor positive
responses consistently across different sorts.

This is especially

important to control for, when people are asked to describe themselves
(self-sorts), since Edwards (1953, 1955) discovered that such Q-sorts
are correlated .84 and .87 for males and females respectively to
profiles arranged on a basis of social desirability.

Moreover, items

should result in high inter-sorter variability to insure greater dis
criminant power and low intra-sorter variability to insure reliable
results (Goodling and Guthrie, 1956).

Harris (1960) has expressed

misgivings about using Q-techniques and indicated that one does not
know if he has selected an adequate or a valid collection of statements.
While this is a hurdle, it is not insurmountable, since the adequacy of
a deck can be established by the process of continual alteration and
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progressive refinement until it attains a recognized descriptive ex
cellence.

Number of cards in a deck is selected for convenience,

statistical demands, and in order to establish stability and relia
bility (Kerlinger, 1964).

Decks usually consist of not less than 60

items, may include as many as 140 items, but in most instances do not
exceed 100 items.
Distributions of Q-decks are an arbitrary matter, but a pre
scribed or forced distribution resulting in a quasi-normal arrange
ment is usually preferred because of its distinct statistical
advantages, allowing parametric manipulation (Block, 1961; Kerlinger,
1964).

Free distributions allow for the expression of biases that

render means and variances highly disparate and rule out the possibil
ity of direct comparisons of two different sorts.

Forced distribu

tions have the same mean and variance, allow for direct comparisons,
produce as much information as free distributions, and lastly allow
greater discrimination (Block, 1961).

Livson and Nichols (1957) sug

gested a rectangular forced sort as productive of the most discrimi
nations possible, but Block (1956) has shown that a normal 9 point
distribution with 100 items allowed almost as many discriminations as
a 9 point rectangular distribution with the same number of items.
The most suitable Q-deck for personality assessment is prob
ably the California Q-deck constructed by Block (1961).

This 100

item deck represents 10 years of refinement, and is the third form of
the items, that have been selected from psychological and psychiatric
reports, specifically for the purpose of describing personality.

It
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employs basic language that is theoretically neutral, suggests con
tinuums and minimizes dichotomies that are unproductive, is generally
not judgmental in tone, and involves as few double meanings as
possible.

The CQ-deck is arranged in a 5:8;12:16;18:16:12:8:5 forced

distribution of nine rating levels to approximate a normal curve and
has been used for research projects since 1961.

Van Atta (1966)

employed it recently as a dependent measure to assess the efficacy of
various personality conceptualizations based on transcribed interview
dialogue.

In general, researchers have found the deck useful,

reliable and heuristic.

Summary and Critique
The preceding discussions demonstrated that the current state
of affairs in clinical judgment and prediction is far from being ideal.
The clinician is now beginning to exceed the accuracy of actuarial
prediction (Lindzey, 1965; Imig, 1967), but this has seldom occurred.
In any case, clinical and actuarial accuracy almost never exceeded a
hit rate of 60 to 707o, and much needs to be done if we are to raise
our level of clinical efficiency to a higher status that is more
acceptable.
Typically, clinicians reject mechanical procedures, probably
irrationally, because of a fear of being made obsolete or perhaps
being replaced by an automated process.

Machines will always require

human direction, but can provide us with helpful clinical data, and
they can free the clinician from routine chores to do more complex
and demanding jobs (Meehr, 1954a; Rotter, 1967).

The clinician who
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works independently of actuarial data proceeds in a linear, additive
fashion much like a regression equation anyway, but he reduces his
efficiency to that of a second rate computer because he employes un
tested, unverified subjective probabilities to evaluate incoming data
(Grebstein, 1963).

Many times he is inaccurate only because he is

emphasizing the wrong, unrelated predictor variables (Oskamp, 1965;
Watley, 1966a).

Because of these facts we should do actuarial

analyses where possible, to discover important factors to be stressed
for accurate prediction.

After pertinent predictors have been iso

lated they can be used as a springboard and clinical skills may be
utilized to determine unique factors in the case, not covered by a
stereotype or a general base rate formulation.
Tests should probably not be used to determine how a patient
is similar to the others in a general group, but will be more bene
ficial in the long run, if they are used to isolate unique, differ
ential, but reliable patient characteristics.

The current literature

would seem to indicate that tests have contributed very little to our
predictive accuracy, but much of the results cannot be embraced in its
entirety.

There is a great need to know why our tests fail, and what

utility they do have in the current clinical practice.

Sechrest

(1963) pointed out, "It seems clear that validity must be claimed
for a test in terms of some increment in predictive efficiency over
the information otherwise easily and cheaply available."

Since

greater amounts of data do not necessarily lead to higher levels of
predictive accuracy, relevant tests must be selected that do make a
worthwhile contribution.
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The Rorschach Test, of all our instruments, would seem to
possess the greatest need for study, since it should have greater con
current and incremental validity, and is the most frequently used
test.

If too many tests can in fact reduce accuracy and create con

fusing redundancies, it is equally possible that there is an optimal
degree of data collection for any single technique or test.

It may

be possible to learn how techniques may be best employed for predic
tion, by assessment of the incremental validity of any segment or
procedure employed within a single test like the Rorschach.
At the present time a complete administration of the Rorschach
consists of the initial card presentation (Free association), an
inquiry concerning the free association, a procedure to test the
limits of perception, scoring of responses by a formal method and
lastly, report writing.

Odum (1950) conducted a survey and reported

that the average time taken for the entire procedure involves four
hours of work.

If any of the above procedures or steps are unproduc

tive it would be useful to eliminate them since the busy clinician
in practice has a shortage of time.
Despite cost in time and money, in research questioning the
validity of the Rorschach, only one investigator has attempted to
find out.how much each part of the test contributes to final predic
tive accuracy.

Unfortunately, like many other Rorschach studies so

many variables were confounded that the results are not easy to inter
pret and have only limited use.
Turner (1966) attempted to determine the optimal amount of
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Rorschach protocol information essential to personality descriptions
for judges at various levels of professional experience.
judges were used;

One hundred

25 undergraduate psychology majors, 25 graduate

students in clinical psychology, 25 Ph.D.'s recently graduated with
less than 5 years experience, and 25 Fellows of the Society of Projec
tive Techniques.

Complete Rorschach protocols were obtained from five

psychiatric inpatients and were divided among the 100 judges so that
each case was seen by 5 judges from each experience level.
Experimental procedure employed a repeated measures design
and each protocol was presented sequentially to the same judge in the
form of four consecutive booklets representing increasing amounts of
protocol data.

One hundred fifty true and false items on personality

were selected from the Little and Shneidman study of 1959 for use as
the dependent variable, and criterion responses to the items were
obtained from a variety of ward personnel familiar with the patient.
Number of sufficiently agreed upon items varied amongst the protocols
from 58 to 76 items, and consequently the results from the different
protocols could not be compared directly.
The four different amounts of protocol information were:

1.

Free Association, 2. Free Association plus location chart, 3, Free
Association and location chart plus Inquiry including the Testing of
the Limits, and 4. an entire scored protocol including the Free
Association, location chart, and Inquiry, plus psychogram and quanti
tative scores contained in the Klopfer and Davidson Individual
Record Blank.

A single judge was asked to read level one information
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and answer the true and false questions, then was asked to go on to
information level two and answer the same true and false questions, go
on to level three etc.
Results indicated no significant increases at the .05 level in
the number of statements answered correctly as protocol information
increased.

In addition, both the Fellows and the Ph.D. 's exceeded the

graduate students, but neither group exceeded the undergraduates.
Results were not surprising and might be attributed to the
experimental design just as well as to the experimental variables of
amount of data and level of professional experience.

First, effects

that differing amounts of data could have had were masked and con
founded by using the same judges and producing a set or training
effect.

It is already known that clinicians tend to make hasty con

clusions on minimal data, and it could not be expected that they would
use additional data if they were forced into a rigid set by requiring
early, full blown personality conceptualizations.

Secondly, even if

the information increments were not subject to confounding, the sample
was a narrow one, and involved only psychiatric inpatients, and this
could have contributed to the superfluousness of added amounts of
data.

Watkins and Stauffacher (1952) showed that only the content of

speech in Rorschach protocols was necessary to identify schizophrenics.
Turner (1963) therefore, could have expected the evaluation of his
population with just the first and minimal level of information.
There was no reason for judges to use any additional information
because of the type of subject that was to be judged.

The use of a

42

constricted sample reduces the generalizability of the results and
further invalidates the sweeping conclusions that were drawn.
Moreover, failure to obtain significant judging differentials
between levels of experience was probably due to the use of a gross,
dichotomous dependent variable that allowed no qualitative differences
to emerge.

True and false questions may have been appropriate for

undergraduates with limited skills, but they are not capable of accom
modating the advanced, trained judge who uses highly qualified judg
ments and predictions.

Effects of assumed similarity (Taft, 1955)

were not controlled for either and favored the younger inexperienced
judges since patients (with exception of one) were in their twenties
(Turner, 1964).

Lastly, Turner made no provisions during the experi

ment, for determining how much judgmental accuracy was due to Rorschach
data or BID, and Gage and Cronbach (1955) cautioned that any measure
of accuracy is meaningless unless it is analyzed for true differential
and for stereotyping accuracy.

The latter must be partialled out of

the results if a true measure of accuracy is to be derived.

A post hoc

attempt was made to eliminate the effect of stereotyping, by eliminat
ing those questions answered in identical directions for the entire
protocol sample.

This technique may have rendered the results ambigu

ous because one could then not tell if the eliminated items were super
ficial and stereotyped, or if they on the other hand did really
represent relevant and therefore true differential observations.
Therefore, an incremental analysis of various Rorschach procedures is
still needed and Turner should be congratulated for making the first
efforts, although inadequate.
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Statement of the Problem
The major purpose of the present study is to determine the
optimal amount of Rorschach protocol data required for maximal accur
acy in personality assessment when experience level of judges and
degree of pathology of the subjects are taken into account.

The first

analysis, proceeding by examining the accuracy of each personality
assessment, will yield a measure of an incremental and predictive
validity of the various Rorschach procedures.
Another purpose of the study will be to determine what amounts
of Rorschach data are required for true differential accuracy in per
sonality assessment when experience and pathology are controlled.

In

this section of the study predictions based upon Rorschach data will
be compared for accuracy with predictions based only upon minimal
identifying data, and this will yield a measure of incremental and pra-...
dictive validity for different types of data sources being compared.
The following hypotheses will be tested:
1.

Accuracy of prediction is highly related to amount of
Rorschach data available.

2.

Less experienced judges will require greater amounts of
data to reach levels of accuracy attained by the more
experienced judges.

3.

More Rorschach data will be required to assess less dis
turbed subjects accurately.

4.

Levels of accuracy for the more disturbed subjects will
be higher than the accuracy levels attained with less
disturbed subjects.

5.

Inexperienced judges will be more accurate with the more
disturbed subjects.
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6

.

7.

8

There will be a positive relationship between experience
and accuracy,
There will be a positive relationship between amount of
data, level of experience and degree of pathology in
regard to accuracy.

. Rorschach data will raise the level of accuracy signifi
cantly above that attained on the basis of only BID.

9.

More experienced judges will be more accurate than less
trained judges with only BID.

10.

BID alone will result in more accuracy with more dis
turbed patients.

11.

More Rorschach data will be needed by inexperienced
judges to exceed accuracy attained on the basis of BID
alone when used by experienced judges.

12.

There will be a negative or inverse relationship between
confidence and accuracy.

13.

There will be a positive relationship between amount of
data and level of confidence.

14.

There will be an inverse relationship between experi
ence level and confidence level.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Procedure
One hundred forty-four judges representing four different
levels of psychological training and experience were asked to complete
California Q-sorts (Appendix B) based upon varying amounts of clinical
data consisting of minimal identifying and Rorschach protocol data.
Accuracy of personality assessment and prediction in the Q-sort was
determined by comparing experimental CQ-sorts with criterion CQ-sorts
completed by persons well acquainted with subjects of the identifying
data and Rorschach protocols.

Judges were asked to indicate the

level of confidence that they had in the correctness of their assess
ments, and also completed a' biographical data sheet.

Judges
Judges were selected closely in accordance with training and
experience levels outlined by Turner (1964) to make results as com
parable as possible.
Group I:

The experience levels were:

36 untrained undergraduates who were then complet
ting an introductory course in psychology.

Group II: 36 undergraduate psychology majors and would have
completed an average of 32 hours of psychology.
Group 111:36 graduate clinical psychology students who had
at least one course in the Rorschach technique,
but had not completed an internship and had not
had extended experience with the inkblots. They
had administered an average of 11 Rorschach tests.
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Group IV: 36 Ph.D.'s who had had prolonged and practical
experience with the Rorschach test, and had
indicated a special interest in Rorschach tech
nique, either directly as a member or Fellow of
the Society of Projective Techniques, or by
Biographical material within the APA directory.
At the time of the experiment they had admin
istered an average of 1,211 Rorschach tests.
The judges were selected from the LSU and University of
Alabama campuses where possible, and additional judges were selected
from the APA and the Society of Projective Techniques directories,
and were contacted via the mails.

Subjects
Rorschach protocols were obtained from six subjects repre
senting three broad degrees of mental health, Normal, Neurotic, and
Psychotic conditions (designated No, Nu, and Po in this study).
Normals were defined as those persons who were currently functioning
and achieving reasonably well within the community, and never re
ceived psychological or psychiatric treatment.

Their MMPI's resulted

in no T scores over 70.

They were selected from Baton Rouge,

Louisiana and environs.

For the purpose of this study, Neurotics

were defined as those persons who functioned with the aid of treat
ment of a psychological/psychiatric nature, but had never been hospi
talized for mental reasons.

Their MMPI's showed T scores greater

than 70 within the first five, but not within the last five scales.
They were recruited from mental health centers within the Baton Rouge
area.

For the purpose of this study, Psychotics were defined as those

subjects who were unable to subsist within the community at large, and
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were residents of one of the Louisiana state institutions for the
mentally ill,

MMPI's obtained from them showed T scores greater

than 70 in the last 5 scales.

No subject was selected who had a

history of any form of organic illness.
All subjects were selected to represent a wide range of age
levels (age 20 to 66, mean age 36,6), and sex was controlled by
selecting 3 males and 3 females.
details for each of the six cases.

Appendix C gives the biographical
(The actual Rorschach and MMPI

records are on deposit with the American Documentation Institute.)

Criterion Judges
CQ-sorts were obtained from either three or four acquaintances
of each subject, who had known the subject for a period not less than
six months.

They consisted of therapists, nurses, social workers,

attendants, colleagues, co-workers and fellow students.

The specific

number and types of judges used with each case are also given in
Appendix C.

Input Data
Six different amounts of data were compared.

They were

selected on a basis of relevance, and were included if in fact a prac
ticing clinician could conceivably utilize such a data source or com
bination for the purpose of making a personality assessment.

They were

as follows:
1.

Basic Identifying Data (BID); age, sex, level of education,
marital status, treatment status, and occupation.

2.

BID plus Free Association (FA) and location sheet (Loc).

48

3.

BID, FA, Loc and scoring (Sc) based on just the FA.

4.

BID, FA, Loc and inquiry (Inq).

5.

BID, FA, Loc, Inq and scoring (Scor) based

on FA and Inq.

.

BID, FA, Loc, Inq, Scor and the Testing of
(TTL).

the Limits

6

Each judge received a packet containing all of the available
information for a given experimental condition, for total considera
tion.

The packet also contained a deck of CQ-items, an instruction

sheet on its use, and a matrix on which to record the final selected
Q-sort,

A biographical data sheet was also completed (see Appendix

D).

Output Data
The dependent variable, the GQ-sort was selected because it is
a simple task allowing for precise qualitative personality assessments
in simple, unconfusing language.

The latter eliminated language as a

factor which could have prevented comparison of performances by judges
who use differing theoretical orientations.

The forced, normal dis

tribution of the CQ-allowed for extensive parametric statistical
analysis.
In order to facilitate post hoc analysis of the results, the
CQ-deck was subjected to an analysis along three dimensions, before
it was employed (see Appendix B ) .

First, 10 judges, not used in the

experiment proper, were asked to rate each of the 100 CQ-items along
a continuum of Social Desirability.

The resulting ranks were averaged

and provided the foundation for a scale on Social Desirability in
reference to the California Q-sort,
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Secondly, another group of five judges, also not used in the
experiment proper, provided judgments that determined whether an item
could be considered a phenotypic or a genotypic statement.
six judges evaluated the

100

Lastly,

items and determined whether an item

could be considered indicative of one of four types of statements:
1. trait, 2, dynamic process, 3. interpersonal behavior, or, 4.
descriptive, overt behavior not necessarily interpersonal.

Results

of these three different types of ranking, and the directions used to
obtain them may be seen in Appendix B.
Product moment correlations were obtained by comparing Q-sorts
of experimental judges with consensual Q-sorts derived from rankings
of criterion judges on each case.
accordance with the formula; r =

Computations were completed in
1

-^ d ?ip

o

n

NVg, where d£p is the

squared difference between the Q-values of corresponding items, N is
the number of items in the Q-set and

is the standard deviation of

the Q-set.

Confidence
Confidence in judgment was measured by asking each judge to
express the total number of CQ-items he believed he had accurately
placed into all of the Q-categories.

Since there were 100 items,

the judges were in effect providing a quantitative expression through
exact percentages which also allow for extensive statistical analysis
(Adams, 1957).

The second expression of confidence was qualitative

and required the judge to indicate how he felt about his performance
and judgments.

A five point scale was provided for this purpose, with
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5 corresponding with Very Well, 3 corresponding with Fair, and 1
corresponding with Very Poorly.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS
Coefficients of correlation obtained by each experimental
judge are given in Appendix A.

They were treated as ordinary scores

(Block, 1961), indicative of judgmental accuracy, and provided the
basis for an analysis of variance (ANOV) on accuracy for the three
major factors of pathology, experience and information.

Mean corre

lation coefficients for main effects have been incorporated into
tables for the mean correlations of all possible double interactions
and are given-in Tables 1, 2 and 3,

Results of the ANOV on accuracy

are given in Table 4,

TABLE 1
MEAN CORRELATIONS FOR PATHOLOGY X EXPERIENCE FACTORS

I

II

III

IV

X

No

.18

.13

.11

.00

.10

Nu

.16

.15

.10

.11

.13

Po

.24

.30

.28

.23

.26

X

.19

.19

.16

.11

KEY:

No - Normal
Nu - Neurotic
Po - Psychotic

I - Untrained Undergraduates
II - Undergraduate Psych Majors
III - Graduate Students
IV - Ph.D.'s
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TABLE 2
MEAN CORRELATIONS FOR PATHOLOGY X INFORMATION FACTORS

1

2

3

4

5

No

.36

.09

.22

.02

.04

-.10

.10

Nu

.25

.08

.16

.10

.18

.02

.13

Po

.28

.32

.19

.26

.25

.27

.26

X

.30

.17

.20

.13

.16

.06

KEY:

X

6

Incremental Information levels.
:

1-6

TABLE 3
MEAN CORRELATIONS FOR EXPERIENCE X INFORMATION FACTORS

1

2

3

4

5

6

X

I

.29

.26

.20

.22

.09

.11

.19

II

.38

.25

.28

.11

.11

.03

.19

III

.31

.16

.19

.11

.22

.05

.16

IV

.23

.04

.11

.07

.21

.04

.11

X

.30

.17

.20

.13

.16

.06

An inspection of Table 4 below reveals that the F ratio of
5.580 obtained for the main effect of pathology was significant at the
.01 level of significance.

The main effect for the information factor

yielded an F ratio of 2.410, which was significant at the .05 level.
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The main effect for the factor of experience did not reach a signifi
cant level, but it was distinctly influential in performances and
will be discussed below.

None of the interactions reached significant

levels,

TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON ACCURACY

Source

DF

MS

F

A (Pathology)

2

.343

5.580**

B (Information)

5

.148

2.410*

G (Experience)

3

.048

A X B

10

.072

B X C

15

.025

A X C

6

.019

A X B X C

30

.034

Sampling Error

72

.061

V

143

TOTAL

** Probability less than .01
* Probability less than .05

Pathology and Accuracy
In order to pinpoint the exact experimental conditions that con
tributed to significance on the pathology factor, Duncan Multiple Range
Tests

(DMRTs) were computed on the basis of the means of the pathology

factor, and the means of both interactions with information and
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experience.

These range tests are given in Tables 5,

6

and 7 imme

diately below.

TABLE 5
DUNCAN MULTIPLE RANGE TEST APPLIED TO THE MAIN FACTOR OF PATHOLOGY

MEANS
A

No

.109

B

Nu

.133

C

Po

.266

A
No

B
Nu

C
Po

.109

.133

.266

.024

.157**
.133*

SHORTEST SIGNIFICANT RANGES
** Significant at a
probability of
less than
.or

* Significant at a
probability of
less than
.05

.05 Level

r2 -

-.101

R 3 - .107

.01 Leve1
R 2 - .135
r3 - .154

TABLE

6

DUNCAN MULTIPLE RANGE TEST APPLIED TO THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
PATHOLOGY & INFORMATION

Pathology
Information Level

A

B — -- M

N

0

P

Q

R

No

Nu

Po
5

Po
4

Po

Po

Po

No

6

1

2

1

.251

.262

.278

.286

.327

.359

.371* .387* .394* .436* .476*

6

-.108
A
B

-.108
.022

6
.022

.367

SHORTEST SIGNIFICANT RANGES
.05 Level
NOTE: The insignificR 13 - .366
R 2g - .370*Indicates significance
ant ranges bet.
R ^4 - .367
R ]7 - .371
at a probability less
B and M not given
R-^ - .369
R 2g “ .372
than .05
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TABLE 7
DUNCAN MULTIPLE RANGE TEST APPLIED TO THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
PATHOLOGY AND EXPERIENCE

A
Experience Level
Pathology Level
MEANS
A

.004

B

.108

B -- --- H

I

J

K

L

IV
No

III
Nu

I
No

IV
Po

I
Po

III
Po

II
Po

.004

.108

.182

.238

.246

.280

.300

.178

.234*

.242*

.275*

.296*
.196

SHORTEST SIGNIFICANT RANGES
.05 Level
Rg RigR 1XRl 2 -

.2333
.2366
.2382
.2384

* Indicates Significance
at the .05 Level
NOTE:

The insignificant
ranges between
means B and H are
not given above.

Table 5 shows that two of the experimental conditions achieved
significant levels.

Protocols obtained from psychotic patients could

be judged more accurately than those for the normal subjects at the
.01

level of significance, and they could be differentiated from

neurotic protocols at a .05 level of significance.

Despite the fact

that records from normals could not be significantly differentiated
from those of neurotics, an examination of the means in Table 1 shows
that as accuracy increases pathology of the subject also increases,
since means for Normals, Neurotics, and' Psychotics were respectively
.10, .13, and .26.
Although the interactions, as previously mentioned, did not
reach significant levels, examination of mean correlations on the
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interactions are revealing regarding the influence that experience
and information can have when judging records of patients manifesting
different degrees of pathology.

Mean correlations for the pathology

factor in Table 1 show a perfect inverse relationship between train
ing and assessment of Normal records, and an almost perfect inverse
relationship in the assessment of Neurotic records, and finally in the
case of protocols from Psychotics the undergraduate psychology majors
achieved the best performance while the Ph.D.'s attained the worst
performance.
The role that the information factor plays in reference to the
factor of pathology can be perceived by referring to Table 2.

The

greatest accuracy for the Normal and Neurotic records was attained by
using just BID.

More information was needed in assessing psychotic

records, but not a great deal more, since the best performance was
achieved by just adding the FA material.

This means that psychotic

records were most accurately judged by the lesser trained individuals
using a minimum of information.

Amount of ‘Information and Accuracy
As cited above, the results of the ANOV (Table 4) show that
the main effect of Information was significant at the .05 level of
significance.
in Table

8

DMRTS for the Information main effect means are given

below.

Here it can be seen that two experimental condi

tions attained significance.

Those judges utilizing BID alone were

significantly more accurate (at the .05 level) than judges utilizing
BID, FA and Inquiry (Information Level 4).

More surprising, it was
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found that judges using just BID were significantly more accurate
(.01

level of significance) than judges having the benefit of using

all available data or information.

TABLE

8

DUNCAN MULTIPLE RANGE TEST APPLIED TO THE MAIN
EFFECT OF INFORMATION

B

C

D

E

F

Info. Leve1
.064
MEANS

.129

.159

.169

.195

.301

A

.064

.065

.095

.105

.131

.237**

.05

B

.129

.030

.040

.066

.172*

C

.159

.010

.036

.142

D

.169

.026

.132

R2-.142
R3-.150
R4-.155
R5-.158
Rg-.161

E

.195

A

SHORTEST
SIGNIFICANT
RANGES
Level
R2- .189
R 3 -.I98
R4-.203
R5-.207
Rg-.210

.106

** Indicates significance at a probability of less than .01
* Indicates significance at a probability of less than .05

Since the intervening Information Level 5 was not significantly
poorer than BID, and both adjacent levels were poorer, it can only be
concluded that scoring based upon inquiry makes a significant contribu
tion to accuracy, because that was the only difference between levels
4 and 5.

If scoring based on Inquiry in Information Level 5 is a sig

nificant increment, then it might also be concluded that it was the
scoring in Level 3 Information (BID, FA, and scoring based on FA) that
might have contributed a significant input since Information Level 3
was also not poorer than BID.

However, the increased accuracy in
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Information Level 3 may have been attained due to the omission of
Inquiry.

This is supported by noting the differential accuracy levels

of conditions 2 and 4.

Information level 2 is identical to level 4

except that the latter also included the Inquiry as part of its total
input.

Means in Table 3 show that accuracy was higher when Inquiry

was omitted and FA was used in isolation.

Figure One graphs all mean

correlation coefficients for the Information main effect.

It can

readily be seen that BID alone exceeded all of the Rorschach condi
tions.

A linear function has been projected through the Rorschach

conditions, and a perfect negative trend is described when levels
4 and

6

are considered.

2

,

Levels 3 and 5 deviate from this pattern and

it should be remembered that these were the conditions that included
scoring.

The failure of level 4 to approximate BID levels of accuracy

shows that an increment of additional verbal input can produce a de
bilitating redundancy or factor of interference.

The lack of additional

verbal information in level 3 may have been significant in allowing the
quantitative data to express a greater influence and render this experi
mental condition the most accurate Rorschach level.

Moreover, the

relationship between data amounts and different degrees of pathology
has already been noted above (Table 2).
It should be pointed out here that BID alone was not greatest
in accuracy with the most pathological records, but was most beneficial
with the less disturbed or normal and neurotic subjects.

In general

the addition of information tended to reduce accuracies for normal and
neurotic subjects, but the mean for the first three levels of informa
tion in the psychotic condition is almost identical to the mean of the
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last three data levels (.263 and .260 respectively).

Rorschach data

provided an increment to BID only when dealing with psychotics.
Rorschach data in question consisted only of FA, itself a form of
minimal data.
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Level of Training and Accuracy
When experience was considered as a main effect in the ANOV
(Table 4), it did not reach significant levels of accuracy.

This does

not mean that experience had no effect upon performance. Means in
Tables 1 and 3 show an almost perfect negative relationship exists
between accuracy and experience.

Results for untrained, trained

undergraduates, graduates and Ph.D.'s were ,19, .19, .16, and .11
respectively.

DMRTs were performed on these means and also the means

for the double interactions involving experience.

There were no sig

nificant ranges and thus no tables will be presented on those computa
tions, except for the interaction between experience and level of
pathology (Table 7).

Here it was discovered that all experience groups

judging protocols from psychotics were significantly more accurate
than the most experienced group judging normals, so that Pathology
rather than Experience must have been the influential factor in that
double interaction.

In reference to the accuracy of the performances

on the psychotic records, it can be seen that the undergraduate psy
chology majors were the most accurate group, while once again the
Ph.D.'s were the least accurate.
In order to determine more fully the causes of the differen
tial performances of the four experience groups, a post hoc analyses
of the large judgmental errors on each individual's Q-sort was com
pleted, group by group.

A miss or an error was recorded for a group

if ten or more judges in a given group deviated from a criterion rat
ing for the item, by four or more ranks.

The total number of recorded
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misses for each experimental group is given in Appendix A.

It can

be seen that more training seems to lead to more total errors, since
Ph.D.'s and graduates made the most errors, psychology majors less,
and finally untrained undergraduates made the smallest number of
errors.

It is interesting to note the graduate students made as many

errors as the Ph.D.'s and yet attained a higher level of accuracy.
This can only mean that the errors were not of the same magnitude and
Ph.D.'s appeared to be extreme when making judgments.
To determine the types of errors each group was making, the
missed CQ-items were evaluated in accordance with the results of two
different rating scales.

Ranking for each item then were examined

across the three pathology groups per each experience group to detect
any trends in the use of any single item.
The first rating scale determined if a CQ-item was phenotypic
or genotypic in content, and is listed in Appendix B,

It was dis

covered that the CQ-sort contains 46 phenotypic and 54 genotypic state
ments, and as percentages would constitute a chance rate of error
expected rate of error for these two types of variables.

or

Table 9 gives

the actual percentages of error by level of training that were attained.
Untrained undergraduates came closest to a chance rate of error.
Graduate students seemed to deviate the most from expected rates and
seem to have had difficulty in assessing covert or underlying pro
cesses of personality.

Psychology majors had less difficulty in this

area, and the Ph.D.'s even less.

62

TABLE 9
ERRORS BY EXPERIENCE GROUPS FOR TWO RANKING SCALES
BY PERCENTAGES

Expected
Rates

Majors

Undergrads

25

20

17

20

25
75

41
59

46
54
16
30
31
23

PhDs

Grads

Total Number Missed

25

Phenotypic Items
Genotypic Items

30
70

Trait Items
Descriptive Items
Dynamic Items
Interpersonal Items

23
15
31
31

80
12

10

12

20

20

52
16

40
30

35
41
12

The errors were further subjected to analysis, this time in
accordance with a four factor rating scale to determine if the pheno
typic mises involved descriptive or interpersonal statements, and if
the genotypic misses involved dynamic processes or simple traits.

The

CQ-deck was found to contain 16% trait, 31%. dynamic, 23% interpersonal
and 30%. descriptive statements.

Once again these proportions were

taken as chance rates of error.

An inspection of Table 9 indicates

that Ph.D.'s have no difficulty in assessing dynamic processes such as
common defense mechanisms, but they do experience a loss of accuracy
when utilizing the Rorschach to make predictions about traits or how a
subject is apt to respond on an interpersonal basis.

Graduate students

on the other hand are able to assess simple traits such as talkative
ness rather well, but do poorly when attempting to determine covert
defense styles or mechanisms.

The data also show that psychology

majors tend to do better regarding dynamic processes, but they have
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just about the same degree of difficulty in judging interpersonal
behavior as the Ph.D.'s.

Completely untrained undergraduates come the

closest to expected rates of errors, but they too had difficulty with
the judgments of dynamic processes.
These results show that greater training with the Rorschach
does not necessarily lead to greater capacity to tap covert and unseen
influences of the personality.

An examination of Appendix C (which

elucidates the items in the four most extreme CQ-sort categories in
the consensual Q-sorts for each case) reveals that covert as well as
overt processes were stressed, and judgmental inaccuracy could not be
ascribed to criterion emphasis upon one type of item to the exclusion
of the other.
Items 2, 33, 38, 39 and 73 (Appendix A) were the most inaccu
rately assessed of all the CQ-items by all the judges regardless of
training.

In general, these and the other errors show that pathology

was overstressed and the positive, healthy aspects of personality
were either minimized or ignored by the judges.

This trend was in

creased as training increased and resulted in the Ph.D.'s performing
poorest with the normal records and best with the psychotic records.

Level of Training and Confidence
Each judge in this investigation was asked to estimate his
degree of confidence in his judgments three times.

First a percentage

was obtained (C-^), then a 5 point scale (ranging from 5 for Very Well
to 1 for Very Poorly) was used to express a subjective or qualitative
confidence estimate,(C2 ) .

Finally, a judge was asked to re-consider
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his initial percentage after he was advised what effect his training
might have had upon his initial estimate, i.e., minimal training leads
to over-estimates, and extensive training leads to under-estimates of
confidence (C3 ).

An ANOV of Confidence on each of the three major

factors, Pathology, Information, and Experience was completed for each
of the three confidence expressions.

No significant results were

attained and thus the summary tables for the ANOVs will not be pre
sented for inspection.

However, Table 10 gives the means for C 3 for

the interaction between experience and information.
the same factors on C2 are presented in Table 11.

The results for
An inspection of

both of the tables shows that all of the judges felt that their per
formance was Fair regardless of level of training or experience, but
the quantitative expression of this feeling varied somewhat in an
inverse manner.

Even though psychology majors and Ph.D.'s felt they

had done equally well, the less trained group expected to attain a much
higher hit rate (12% more correct rankings).

Neither quantitative nor

qualitative expressions of confidence changed as a result of having
added amounts of information, according to the means in these tables.
Means for experience groups I through IV on C3 were respectively
42.47, 50.88, 44.19, and 47.02.

These mean revised quantitative esti

mates of confidence were compared with the original estimates (C^) to
determine the direction and degree of altered confidence.

A mean reduc

tion of 8.89, 7.48, and 3.17 points were evidenced for groups I, II,
and III,
points.

The Ph.D.'s increased their mean confidence estimate by 1.52
These results reveal that there is an inverse relationship
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TABLE 10
MEANS FOR CONFIDENCE VARIABLE 1 FOR
EXPERIENCE X INFORMATION FACTORS

1

2

3

4

5

6

X

I

63.66

66.50

41.33

41.84

44.50

50.33

51.36

II

59.66

56.83

61.16

63.83

65.83

42.83

58.36

III

39.16

_ 45.16

53.33

59.50

37.50

49.50

47.36

IV

41.66

45.00

60.66

44.33

33.33

48.00

45.50

X

51.04

53.37

54.12

52.37

45.29

47.66

TABLE

11

MEANS FOR CONFIDENCE VARIABLE 2 FOR
EXPERIENCE X INFORMATION FACTORS

1

2

3

4

5

6

X

3.33

3.00

2 .66

2.50

2.83

3.00

2.88

II

3.00

3.33

2.83

3.66

3.16

2.83

3.13

III

3.16

3.00

3.33

3.16

2.83

3.16

3.11

IV

2.66

3.50

3.66

3.16

2.50

3.33

3.13

X

3.04

3.20

3.12

3.12

2.83

3.08

I.
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between experience and a willingness to alter quantitative estimates
of correctness or confidence, since less training allowed one to make
a greater mean change in initial estimates.
from their original decisions on confidence.

Ph.D.'s deviated the least
The direction of the

changes and the sizes also show that the judges were appropriate in
their feelings of their own level of expertise, since the less trained
were more apt to agree that they had over-estimated and the more
trained judges agreed they had under-estimated.

Level of Accuracy and Confidence
Performances of the judges were broken down into Lo, Med and Hi
accuracy groups by ranking coefficients of correlation on each level
of pathology, case by case, and dividing the continuum into equal
thirds.

The findings on confidence variables 1 and 2 for accuracy and

level of pathology are given in Tables 12 and 13.

Means of accuracy for

confidence variable 1 for the Low, Medium and High Accurate groups were
respectively, 53.51, 51.86, and 48.96.

Thus there appears to be an

inverse relationship between the quantitative expression of confidence
and accuracy.

Once again the relationship does not hold when a subjec

tive or qualitative approximation (C2 ) is required.

Means for each

level of pathology for both expressions of confidence are congruent
however, and judges felt they had done best with the Normal subjects
and worst with the Neurotic subjects, on both a subjective and an ob
jective basis.
Ranges and Cq means associated with each subjective category on
the C2 variable are located in Table 14.

It is interesting to note

TABLE 12
MEANS FOR CONFIDENCE VARIABLE 1 ON THE FACTORS OF ACCURACY AND PATHOLOGY

CASE

3

4

56.10

45.63

57.62

53.75

56.51

51.88

55.12

62.12

58.62

56.99

57.16

57.07

1

2

Lo

56.57

55.62

Med

59.28

Hi
X

No

Nu

5

6

51.63

56.12

49.50

52.81

53.51

39.12

45.50

39.63

67.50

53.57

51.86

47.50

40.75

44.13

39.50

48.75

44.13

48.96

48.33

45,83

47.08

45.08

55.25

50.16

Po

X

TABLE 13
MEANS FOR CONFIDENCE VARIABLE 2 ON THE FACTORS OF ACCURACY AND PATHOLOGY

CASE

1

2

No

3

4

Nu

5

6

Po

X

Lo

3.25

3.25

3.25

3.12

3.12

3.12

3.37

2.87

3.12

3.16

Med

2.87

3.12

3.00

3.12

2.50

2.81

3.00

3.25

3.12

2.97

Hi

3.62

2.87

3.25

2.62

2.75

2.68

2.75

3.62

3.18

3.04

X

3.24

3.08

3.16

2.95

2.79

2.89

3.04

3.24

3.14
CTi

ON
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that while the quantitative expression of confidence does generally
increase as one begins to feel on a subjective basis that he has judged
accurately, there is no assurance that the quantitative and qualitative
expressions of confidence will be appropriate to each other.

Ranges

for all the C2 categories are basically so large that a judge can feel
he has done very well while he has judged anywhere from 25% to 99% of
the items correctly.

Similarly, when a judge says he has performed

poorly, he may have correctly identified from 5 to 50% of the itemsv
This means that some of the judges who felt they did very poorly esti
mated their level of accuracy to be greater than that of judges who had
considered that they had done very well in their performances, and vice
versa.

TABLE 14
COMPARISON OF CONFIDENCE VARIABLES 1 AND 2

Subjective Estimate
of Performance C2
Very Poorly (1 )

Percent of
Sample

Range of
Cl

Mean of
Cl

3

5-50

33.75

Poorly

(2 )

18

5-80

34.57

Fair

(3)

52

20-80

51.04

Well

(4)

21

25-90

67.20

Very Well

(5)

6

25-99

69.00

Criterion Measures
All of the foregoing results are meaningful only insomuch as the
criterion Q-sorts on which they depend are accurate and are reliable
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measures of the personalities of protocol subjects.

This would in

turn depend upon inter-judge (criterion) agreement.

Table 15 presents

the mean correlation coefficients of all combinations of criterion
judges per case.

Agreement between judges for psychotic cases was

lower than that attained by persons judging either normal or neurotic
cases.

An adaptation (Block, 1961) of the Spearman-Brown Prophecy

Formula ( N(Average inter-judge correlation)/l - (N-l)(Average inter
judge correlation) ) was applied to all cases to determine the degree
to which disagreement on the personalities of the subjects was directly
related to specific judges or if any other composites of judges would
respond with a similar level of disparity.

Spearman-Brown coefficients

of reliability are also given in Table 15, and although the correlations
for the psychotic cases were still lowest, the reliability level was
reasonably high.

The Spearman-Brown correlations for the four other

cases were generally high and this means that additional groups of
criterion judges would quite likely attain the same rate of agreement
on other CQ-sorts for the same subjects.

This also means that the

TABLE 15
INTER-JUDGE AGREEMENT, SPEARMAN-BROWN AND
SOCIAL DESIRABILITY COEFFICIENTS

CASE

3

4

Nu

5

.49

.40

.70

.55

.68

.76

.73

.88

.19

.48

.32

.66

1

2

Inter-judge
Agreement

.57

.41

Spearman Brown

.84

Social Desirability .78

No

6

Po

.26

.20

.23

.81

.58

.50

.54

.49

.36

-.43

-.04
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original patient judgments and resulting CQ-sorts were representative
and stable.

Additional criterion stability was achieved by the addi

tional measure of utilizing mean or consensual CQ-item values to form
the ultimate consensual criterion CQ-sorts.
Two extreme positive and negative ranking categories for each
case are to be found in Appendix C.

An inspection of items reveals

that there were specific CQ-items that were empirically associated
with each case and level of pathology, to the exclusion of the remain
ing levels of pathology, on the criterion CQ-sorts.

As an example only

Normal subjects were described by the criterion judges as being skepti
cal (item 1) and calm (item 33), but not extrapunitive (item 23), con
descending (item 27) or non-conforming (item 62).

Only the Neurotic

subjects were described as being uncomfortable with uncertainties and
complexities (item 9) and not satisfied with the self (item 74).

They

did not have flattened affect (item 97) and were not able to handle
anxiety and conflict by refusing to recognize their presence (item

8 6 ).

Psychotics were characterized as being prone (extremely) to think and
associate to ideas in unusual ways, have unusual thought processes
(item 39), engage in personal fantasy and daydreams and also fictional
speculations (item 46).

They were positively described as persons one

would not turn to for advice (item 29).

Social Desirability and Accuracy
Lastly, it has been suggested elsewhere that the Rorschach test
can best assess undesirable traits (McGreevey, 1962), while acquaint
ances of subjects can best assess desirable traits.

The present results
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do not support such a contention.

Consensual CQ-sorts of each case

were correlated with a Social Desirability CQ-sort based upon the con
sensual ranking of 10 raters (see Appendix B, for the consensual CQ-sort
of Social Desirability, and Table 15 for the resulting coefficients of
social desirability).

Table 16 presents the rankings of each of the six

cases used in this study, in terms of difficulty of assessment (accuracy)
and relates these values to ranks arranged in terms of social desirabil
ity for the same cases.

Firstly, Table 15 reveals that social desirabil

ity and mental health are not necessarily concommitant with each other,
since the female psychotic Q-sort resulted in a Social Desirability
coefficient of .36 and the normal male subject attained a Social Desira
bility coefficient of .19 by contrast.

Secondly, if the Rorschach test

does tap undesirable characteristics, an inverse relationship should be
expected.

Accuracy of assessment should increase as the criterion

CQ-sort increasingly assumes a socially undesirable profile.

Inspection

of Table 16 manifests a positive rather than a negative relationship be
tween ease of assessment and social desirability.

TABLE 16
RANKINGS FOR CASES ON SOCIAL DESIRABILITY AND
EASE OF ASSESSMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

Social Desirability 1

5

4

2

3

6

Ease of Assessment

5

6

3

4

1

Case

2

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

Pathology and Accuracy
The results of this investigation show that accuracy with the
Rorschach test increased as the degree of subject disturbance increased.
Records from psychotic patients could be discriminated from those of
normals or neurotics quite easily with a high degree of confidence and
accuracy.

These findings agree with those of Watkins and Stauffacher

(1952), who found that records from psychotics could be identified
significantly better than those from normals and neurotics on the
Rorschach, when a rating scale for verbal deviance was used.

Information Amount and Accuracy
Six different, incremental conditions of information were used
in this study to determine which Rorschach procedures were most pro
ductive In personality assessment and judgmental accuracy.
an increase in data resulted in a decrease of accuracy.

Generally,

Those informa

tion conditions that included scoring deviated somewhat from this
trend.

Scoring based upon Free Association appeared to be more effec

tive than scoring based upon the traditional combination of Free Asso
ciation and Inquiry.

That a modified scoring procedure can be effective

has already been demonstrated by Gibby and Stotsky (1953).

They found

very little substantive difference in the production of important
determinants in regard to the two different scoring conditions in
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question.

Moreover, assessments made on the basis of information

Level 3 (BID, FA and scoring based upon FA) were superior to all other
assessments, including those made on the basis of Information Level 4
(BID, FA and Inq).

This means that an increase in verbal material may

provide additional data, but it is redundant, overlapping and is not a
source of additional information.

Free Association plus scoring based

upon it in all likelihood excels because it involves two different
types of data that are not redundant and therefore provides more infor
mation.

Shapiro (1959) advocates that the Free Association and Scoring

be used in combination because one tends to enhance the meaning of the
other, and content brings greater meaning to determinants.

Concerning

the exclusive use of the FA/Sc combination, Odum (1950) showed that the
elimination of the Inquiry and the Testing of the Limits results in an
average of 45 minutes in time saved.

This saving becomes even more sig

nificant when it is kept in mind that a shortened Rorschach procedure
will more importantly also result in a more accurate personality assess
ment .
In some cases where a patient is notably disturbed, it can be
profitable to make use of the Free Association by itself.

Table 2

shows that by far the best data source for the assessment of the psy
chotics was the second information condition or just the Free Associa
tion.

This finding once again is consistent with the work of Watkins

and Stauffacher (1952) who found that Rorschach verbalizations by
themselves were sufficient for the accurate identification of psychotics.
Moreover, this result also supports one of the major contentions of

73

this study that Turner's judges (1964) required only the FA to attain
their greatest levels of accuracy, because they were assessing only
inpatients who were all severely ill, or required hospitalization.
Caution should be taken before considering the general use of just FA,
because greatest accuracies for Normals and Neurotics in the present
study were attained when the FA/Sc combination was utilized.

Turner

(1964) could not make a contribution concerning this information condi
tion, because he failed to consider the efficacy of such a source., or
incorporate it into his study.
According to Odum (1950) reliance on just the Free Association
material when used for testing purposes should yield an average of 1
hour and 36 minutes in saved time,

This certainly can be of consider

able benefit to clinicians who are already overburdened in their profes
sional responsibilities.

Again it is even more significant to realize

that a modified, shortened approach would result in greater accuracy
with psychotics.

Ironically, the total information condition, with

maximal verbal and quantitative Rorschach data, including Testing of
the Limits, consistently resulted in the poorest performances, at a
level of significance with a probability less than .01.
Despite the fact that some Rorschach conditions were consis
tently superior to others, it was the surprising finding of this
investigation that the accuracy attained by using just BID was exceeded
by Rorschach accuracy only once.

This occurred with the exclusive use

of FA with psychotics, which is itself, a condition of minimal informa
tion.

It was originally hypothesized that Rorschach accuracies would
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exceed BID accuracies, but the results did not support this contention.
Rather, the findings agree with other researches that have demonstrated
the superiority of minimal data for accurate personality assessment
(Kelly and Fiske,1951; Soskin, 1954; Kostlan, 1954; Sines, 1959; Soskin,
?

1959).

If minimal data can generate higher levels of accuracy it can

do so probably because it stimulates the use of stable and appropriate
stereotypes (Stelmachers and McHugh, 1964).
Performances in the current study support the notion that the
Rorschach may be inaccurate because it causes one to over-estimate or
stress negative findings and employ an inappropriate stereotype or per
sonality model.

Similar findings of Soskin (1959) with the Thematic

Apperception Test indicate that this trend may be related to projective
testing in general and not just to Rorschach technique.

Patterns of

missed CQ-items show that the judges refused to acknowledge ego strengths
or positive characteristics of protocol subjects.

It seemed as if the

more trained judges had been set to be receptive to maladaptation, but
have not learned how to recognize health on the Rorschach.

The tendency

for accuracy to increase as pathology increased is probably due to the
fact that Rorschach generated, negative stereotypes became more -appro
priate as deviance and pathology increased in reality.
Judges in this study could have been more accurate if they had
weighted the social data of the BID more heavily as they assessed the
meaning of the Rorschach data.

It seemed to make little difference to

judges that the Normal subjects had never required treatment and were
productive citizens in their respective lives.

It is possible that
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Rorschach accuracy might be increased if an interpreter considered the
Rorschach data within the framework of a stereotype.

Appropriate

stereotypes would be formed on the basis of the available BID data, and
negative Rorschach elements would be emphasized or ignored depending
upon whether or not the subject had an absence of, or manifested commen
surate negative signs in his actual life history.

To be practical, this

approach, of necessity, requires that we learn more about personality
base rates, group characteristics, ethnic differentials and any other
areas of study that will result in a thorough delineation of useful
stereotypes.
Q-sort technique may be a helpful method for isolating group
characteristics and base rates for different diagnostic categories.

It

has already been mentioned that Q-items were differentially and empiri
cally associated with each of the three diagnostic groups in this study.
Block (1961) discussed some work that has already been completed with
mothers of schizophrenic children, and noted that item configurations
could be isolated.

Such configurations may prove to be highly reliable

indicators of group membership and a collection of such items could com
prise an extremely stable guide or stereotype.
It might be said the Rorschach technique cannot be uses success
fully for all of our personality assessment needs, and base rates or
stereotypes may prove to be more suitable for routine tasks.

If that

be the actual case, then it will be necessary for us to discover the
specific uses and conditions under which Rorschach techniques can be
made superior in accuracy.
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Level of Training and Accuracy
Another finding of this study that is surprising is the fact
that experience or level of training made no difference in the judgmen
tal accuracy of personality assessments.

One of the major contentions

of this investigation was the assertion that experts had not been given
an opportunity to demonstrate their expertise.

It was felt that prior

research tasks were inappropriate for experts because they were either
unfamiliar, unrealistic or too simple to allow for highly qualitative
performances.

The CQ-sort used in this study was equally comprehendable

to undergraduates and Ph.D.'s, required familiar personality assessments
and was highly qualitative since it affords the possibility of 43,000
different Q-sort arrangements (Block, 1961).

The ANOV produced no sig

nificant experience effect, but the means did show an inverse trend
between accuracy and experience.
This result was partially due to the fact that the tendency to
emphasize pathology and utilize an inappropriate negative stereotype in
creased as training level increased.

There were also indications that

more training led to greater risk taking.

Even though Ph.D. 's and

graduate students had the same amount of recorded errors, and many of
the errors were identical, the Ph.D.'s were less accurate because they
over-emphasized the meanings of the signs, tending to be extreme in
their ratings.

Risk-taking has been thoroughly discussed by Sarbin ej:

a l . (1960) as a source of clinician's judgmental inaccuracy, and
Soskin's (1959) assertion of the emphasis on psychopathology has al
ready been mentioned.

Results on experience and accuracy in this
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investigation supported both of these mentioned research endeavors.
Consequently, it would seem that clinicians would benefit from using a
conservative approach to interpretation and make extreme judgments only
where they are clearly supported by numerous bits of concommitant
evidence,
The level of accuracy attained with minimal information was
generally higher for less trained judges.

This differential perfor

mance could have been due to a number of factors.

First, clinicians

have learned to depend on test data and weight Rorschach evidence
heavily.

Trained judges tended to disregard helpful life data under

the circumstances, because they were probably unfamiliar with the pre
dictive potential of social history, even though it has been substan
tially verified in the research literature (Winch and More 1956; Little
and Shneidman 1959; Miller and Bieri 1963).
Secondly, the reduced accuracy of experienced judges with BID
only, could have been due to the fact that experience can be an inter
fering rather than a helpful factor in prediction and clinical judgment.
In evaluating data, a clinician must choose between many alternatives
or explanations for the same behavioral phenomenon.

The likelihood of

making an incorrect decision is greater when there are many selections
to be made as a consequence of greater experience.

On the other hand,

the less trained judge has little or no backlog of experiences and must
select amongst few alternatives.

These alternatives have a great like

lihood of being correct however, because if they are known to the layman
at all, they represent events that have become familiar through constant
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recurrence and are reliable events.

The clinicians may have been in

accurate because they have selected interpretations based on rare
events having very little reliability (Sarbin e_t £ l ., 1960).

Thus

better performances by the inexperienced judges does not necessarily
mean they made better use of the Rorschach material.

It could mean

that they relied upon stereotypes which were the highly reliable
sources of their behavioral data.
Findings on the information factor combined with the lack of
differential effect of experience, experimentally support the wisdom
of a growing trend to advocate the employment of the less trained
personnel as data gatherers and psychometricians (Holt's revision of
Rapaport, 1968).

The current results further suggest that technicians

with little training may be able to compose rapid, accurate psycho
logical reports by utilizing a limited or shortened form of the
Rorschach, considered within the framework of a variety of special
ized q-sorts.

This would allow the more experienced and trained prac

titioner to become involved in less routine tasks requiring immediate
and mature decisions, i.e., therapy with psychotic patients, crisis
intervention, community wide conflict, etc.

Training, Accuracy and Confidence
In 1962, Oskamp advocated the study of confidence in clinical
judgment as a possible discriminator factor in the identification of
expertise.

It was reasoned that experts would probably be more con

fident in their judgements, but an opposite effect has obtained in a
number of studies (Oskamp, 1962; Sperber and Alderstein, 1961; Oskamp,
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1965; Watley, 1966).

The meaning of more confidence among less trained

and accurate judges has been obscured by the fact that various re
searches could not be directly compared.

Comparison was precluded be

cause some of the investigators employed ordinal scales (Sperber and
Alderstein, 1961; Gordon, 1966), and others used interval scales
(Oskamp, 1962, 1965).

One of the aims of the present study was a

clarification of the relationship between ordinal and interval data in
reference to the expression of confidence in judgment.
Less experienced and less accurate judges over-estimated their
obtained accuracy when asked to make a quantitative expression of con
fidence on an interval scale.

However, there were no differences

between experience or accuracy levels when judges were asked to subjec
tively express how they felt they had performed.
they turned in a "Fair" performance.

Most judges indicated

This means that the judges were

just as confident as each other in their feelings, but their quantita
tive concepts of what constituted an average or fair performance
differed.

More experience would tend to render one more aware of the

complexity of the judgmental task and result in a conservative or low
quantitative expectation.

Less experienced judges have little or no

statistical conception of the difficulty of the task and unrealistically expect many hits or correct judgments.
This line of reasoning helps to explain why low accurate judges
give higher estimates than high accurate judges.

It is not because

they are more confident, but rather it is because less judgmental
acumen goes hand in hand with miscalculating differential hit rates
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that can be expected for any given level of subjective performance.
It seemed more likely that experienced judges were more confident than
inexperienced judges, since Ph.D.'s changed their initial confidence
estimates least of all the groups when given the chance to do so.

Re

sults show that prior findings on confidence need to be re-considered.
Performances obtained indicate the meaning of interval data can be
accurately appraised only when viewed in conjunction with ordinal or
subjective data.

It is possible that Oskamp's (1962, 1965) judges

were expressing differential levels of statistical sophistication,
rather than differing levels of confidence in clinical judgment.

Criterion Measures
In any validity research, the acceptability of the criterion
measure as an appropriate standard of performance will determine if
results are meaningful or useless.

The criterion utilized in this study

was selected directly on the basis of Meehl's (1959b) assertion that
test results can be useful only insomuch as they contributed advance
data that would eventually be available to key personnel after pro
longed contact with patients or subjects in the ordinary course of
events.

The criterion for this study consisted of judgments made by key

personnel or acquaintances who knew the subject quite well.

They should

have had considerable personality data at their disposal as a result of
prolonged contact and reasonably large samples of patient behavior.
While a good deal of agreement between judges could be obtained,
interjudge reliability varied, and this was a weak point.

When judges

formed a homogeneous grouping, reliability was high, but when the
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heterogeneous hospital staff was used reliability was notably lowered.
It is reasonable and to be expected that agreement on an assessment
of the personality of a patient will be greatest when judges share the
same training experiences and orientations.

This last fact has great

implications regarding the establishment of the predictive validity of
the Rorschach test.

It is possible that previous attempts to match

Rorchach results with a variety of criterions have failed not because
the Rorschach results were inaccurate, but because the two sources of
comparison represented dissimilar and discordant methods of evaluating
the same phenomena.
It may be unreasonable or unrealistic under such circumstances
to expect the Rorschach results to coincide perfectly with judgments
made by professionals in other disciplines.

Moreover, if a hetero

geneous grouping of personnel cannot agree very well on the person
ality of a single patient, Meehl (1959b) may be mistaken when he
indicates that first hand patient contact should make one a legitimate
standard for predictive validity.

A group of such judges should be

used with caution, and only if it can be demonstrated that their ob
servations are reliable and accurate, or in any event it must be shown
that extreme biases have been controlled or accounted for.

According

to Block (1961) the reduction of the influence of such rater bias is
best carried out by averaging ratings across judges and deriving con
sensual judgments.

He indicated that the method probably creates a

profile that is a more accurate and objective approximation of the
personality, than individual assessments.

It seems likely that a
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consensual profile would furnish a more reasonable criterion for
Rorschach accuracy, especially when that criterion is based upon
judgments of personnel representing different disciplines.

Such a

criterion was used with each case in this study.
Results of the current study lend some evidence that the
Rorschach can be used with success in selected cases, as a predictive
device.

In some of the cases in this study, judges attained coeffi

cients of agreement that were smaller than the coefficients derived by
correlating Rorschach with the consensual, objective CQ-sorts, for the
same case.

As an example, in case six the average coefficient of

criterion judge agreement was .41.

More than 60% of the Rorschach

judges on case six attained a correlation of .41 or better.

It would

seem that if a Rorschach test had been obtained for this patient upon
admission to the hospital, it would definitely have provided useful and
meaningful material for the four judges involved, who could not agree
very well.

On the other hand, it must be pointed out that this case

was the only case in which Rorschach correlations could consistently
exceed criterion judge agreement correlations.

Therefore, one must

conclude that much more research needs to be completed to determine how
the Rorschach should be refined or how Rorschach users should be trained
to increase accuracy and validity.

Some suggestions have already been

propagated by this research.

The Hypotheses
In concluding, the results of this research can be applied to
the formal hypotheses as follows:

__
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1 - Accuracy of prediction is highly related to amount of Rorschach
data available; This hypothesis was not supported, for the minimal
data conditions yielded the highest levels of accuracy.
2 - Less experienced judges will require greater amounts of data to
reach levels of accuracy attained by the more experienced judges;
Not supported. Less trained judges did just as well as the more
trained judges, regardless of the amount of the data that was
given.
3 - More Rorschach data will be required to assess less disturbed sub
jects accurately; Not supported. Minimal data conditions were
effective for all cases regardless of degree of the disturbance.
4 - Levels of accuracy for the more disturbed subject will be higher
than the accuracy levels attained with less disturbed subjects:
Supported at the .01 level of significance. Psychotics could be
more accurately assessed than either Normals or Neurotics. In
addition, the accuracy levels for Neurotics were higher than that
attained for the Normals.
5 - Inexperienced judges will be more accurate with the more disturbed
subjects: The converse was supported. More experienced judges
performed best with Psychotics and less experienced judges attained
their highest relative accuracies with the Normals.
6 - There will be a positive relationship between experience and
accuracy: Not supported. The results indicate a trend describing
an inverse relationship between experience and accuracy.
7 - There will be a positive relationship between amount of data, level
of experience and degree of pathology in regard to accuracy: Not
supported. The most accurate performances were based on little
data, were obtained by the less trained judges.
8 - Rorschach data will raise the level of accuracy significantly above
that attained on the basis of only BID: Not supported. BID sur
passed all Rorschach conditions, save one, and at some a ,01 level
of significance.
9 - More experienced judges will be more accurate than less trained
judges with only BID: The converse was supported. The less trained
judges attained higher accuracy with minimal data.
10- BID alone will result in more accuracy with more disturbed patients;
Not supported. The BID condition used in isolation produced highest
levels of accuracy with Normals and Neurotics, but not Psychotics.
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11

- More Rorschach data will be needed by inexperienced judges to
exceed accuracy attained on the basis BID alone when used by ex
perienced judges; Not supported. The inexperienced judges did
as well as more experienced judges on all information conditions.

12 - There will be a negative or inverse relationship between confi
dence and accuracy; Partially supported. An inverse relationship
obtained for the quantitative expression, but not the qualitative
expression of confidence.
13

- There will be a positive relationship between amount of data and
level of confidence; Not supported. Confidence did not increase,
regardless of amount of information available.

14 - There will be an inverse relationship between experience level and
confidence level; Partially supported. This relationship did
obtain for the quantitative, but not the qualitative expression of
confidence.

Critique and Suggestions for Further Research
The outcome of this research has important implications for train
ing and clinical practice and some of them have already been advanced
above.

It shows that we need to train our students to recognize basic

group patterns or stereotypes, and also conditions under which it is
inappropriate to give great weight to negative Rorschach findings.

It

is possible that students may benefit from course work stressing use of
minimal social data and abbreviated Rorschach techniques.

In addition,

students would benefit from being taught to assess signs of health as
well as signs of pathology on frequently used psychological instruments.
However, certain limitations of the investigation make it necessary
to make further evaluations with caution.

The design of this study was

complex and it was impossible to fill all of the experimental cells
more than twice.

As such it was impossible to estimate the degree to

which sampling error and idiosyncracies of the judges shaped some of
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the outcomes even though high levels of significance were obtained.
The entire experiment ideally should be replicated and the combined
performances would then constitute a firm basis for the foregoing
conclusions.
Although care was taken to select experts, it is impossible to
determine to what extent any selected Ph.D. actually was outstanding
in his capacity to utilize Rorschach techniques.

Ideally one would

have to arrange a test of skills, but this was impossible through the
mails and because of the limited time of busy clinicians.

Similarly,

since all of the judges worked unobserved it was impossible to estimate
if care had been taken in making judgments and this might have been
crucial, especially in the case of practicing clinicians who might have
been rushed and pressed for time.
The use of different subjects, subsisting under differing cir
cumstances made it necessary to utilize criterion judges that were
extremely diverse in terms of training, education, relationship with
the subject, etc.

It is difficult to estimate what effect this might

have had on the formation of the consensual criterion CQ-sorts.

The

CQ-sort was selected for this study because it most satisfied the needs
of the problem.

However, judges complained of its length and indicated

the task became extremely tedious with time.

Thus a fatigue factor

could have been responsible for reducing accuracy, in an uncontrollable
and unknown manner.

An abridged form of the CQ-sort would be helpful

in eliminating this element.
Moreover, this study has investigated accuracy with one
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instrument, and therefore generalizations about clinician's efficacy
have had to be made on fragmentary evidence.

In reality, clinicians

use more than one source of data to make complete personality assess
ments in an applied setting, and accuracy would be higher than that
which was obtainable in the present study.

Nonetheless, it cannot be

ignored that inexperienced judges did do as well as the experienced
judges with the identical limited data sources.
This study has suggested the need for further investigation.
As already noted, there is a need to develop an abridged form of the
CQ-sort.

This could be achieved by identifying those items that are

never used in the extreme categories, or are used in identical direc
tions for applications to diverse groups of subjects.
If stereotypes are an important factor in personality assess
ment, a study or a series of studies could be completed, perhaps
utilizing the q-sort technique, that would empirically identify endur
ing characteristics of different diagnostic groups.
Basic identifying and social history data are also important
to consider.

The BID selected for this study were effective in helping

to produce accurate personality descriptions, but further inquiry is
needed to determine what the most helpful types and combinations of
such data would be.
Finally, an examination of the various procedures of the
Rorschach technique has been completed herein.

It has been shown that

portions of the total administration make a greater contribution toward
total accuracy than others.

It is possible that selected Rorschach
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cards, or combinations of cards may have similar differential effec
tiveness.

It may be possible to isolate combinations of cards that can

be utilized for specific purposes, or possibly a short form of the
Rorschach could be devised for general use.
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NUMBER OF SPECIFIC ERRORS HELD IN COMMON PER GROUP

Ph.D.'s and Graduates

17

Graduates and Majors

13

Ph.D.'s and Majors

10

Majors and Untrained
Undergraduates

9

Graduates and Untrained
Undergraduates

7

Ph.D.'s and Untrained
Undergraduates

5

KEY TO CHART ON FOLLOWING PAGE

P - Phenotypic Statement

D - Descriptive Statement

G - Genotypic Statement

I - Interpersonal Statement
Dy- Dynamic Process Statement
T - Trait Statement

X

-

An error of four or more ranks
by 10 or more judges in the group
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CQ-Item No.
2.
8.
9.
10.
11.
13.
16.
17.
20.
22.
26.
28.
29.
32.
33.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
55.
59.
60.
64.
65.
71.
73.
75.
78.
86.
88.
90.
92.
93.
94.
96.
97.
100.
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G
G
G
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P
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P-13
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Dy
Dy
I
T
Dy
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D
Dy
D
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I
Dy
D
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T
T
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Dy
Dy
Dy
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D
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D
D
T
D
I
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X
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X
X
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X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
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X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

25

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

20
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California Q-sort Form III
1.

Is critical, skeptical, not easily impressed,

2.

Is a genuinely dependable and responsible person,

3.

Has a wide range of interests (N.B. Superficiality
or depth of interest is irrelevant here.)

4.

Is a talkative individual.

5.

Behaves in a giving way toward others. (N.B.
regardless of the motivation involved.)

6.

Is fastidious.

7.

Favors conservative values in a variety of areas.

8.

Appears to have a high degree of intellectual
capacity. (N.B. whether actualized or not.)
(N.B. Originality is not necessarily assumed.)

9.

Is uncomfortable with uncertainty and complexities,

10. Anxiety and tension find outlet in bodily symptoms.
(N.B. If placed high, implies bodily dysfunction;
if placed low, implies absence of autonomic
arousal.)
11. Is protective of those close to him, (N.B. Place
ment of this item expresses behavior ranging
from overprotection through appropriate
nurturance to a laissez-faire, under-protective
manner.)
12. Tends to be self-defensive.
13. Is thin-skinned; sensitive to anything that can
be construed as criticism or an interpersonal
slight,
14. Genuinely submissive; accepts domination comfortably,
15. Is skilled in social techniques of imaginative
play, pretending and humor.
16. Is introspective and concerned with self as an
object. (N.B. introspectiveness per se does not
imply insight.)
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17. Behaves in a sympathetic or considerate manner.
18. Initiates humor.
19. Seeks reassurance from others.
20. Has a rapid personal tempo; behaves and acts quickly,
21. Arouses nurturant feelings in others.
22. Feels a lack of personal meaning in life.
23. Extrapunitive; tends to transfer or project blame.
24. Prides self on being "objective," rational.
25. Tends toward over-control of needs and impulses;
binds tensions excessively; delays gratification
unnecessarily.
26. Is productive; gets things done.
27. Shows condescending behavior in relations with
others. (N.B. Extreme placement toward uncharac
teristic end implies simply an absence of
condescension, not necessarily equalitarianism
or inferiority.)
28. Tends to arouse liking and acceptance in people,
29. Is turned to for advice and reassurance.
30. Gives up and withdraws where possible in the
face of frustration and adversity. (N.B. If placed
high, implies generally defeatist; if placed
low, implies counteractive.)
31. Regards self as physically attractive.
32. Seems to be aware of the impression he makes
on others.
33. Is calm, relaxed in manner.
34. Over-reactive to minor frustrations; irritable.,
35. Has warmth; has the capacity for close relation
ships; compassionate.
36. Is subtly negativistic; tends to undermine and
obstruct or sabotage.
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37. Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative,
opportunistic.
38. Has hostility_towards others. (N.B. Basic hostility
is intended here; mode of expression is to be
indicated by other items.)
39. Thinks and associates to ideas in unusual ways;
has unconventional thought processes.
40. Is vulnerable to real or fancied threat,
generally fearful.
41. Is moralistic. (N.B. Regardless of the partic
ular nature of the moral code.)
42. Reluctant to commit self to any definite course
of action; tends to delay or avoid action.
43. Is facially and/or gesturally expressive.
44. Evaluates the motivation of others in inter
preting situations. (N.B. Accuracy of evaluation
is not assumed.) (N.B. Extreme placement in
direction implies pre-occupation with motiva
tional interpretation; at the other extreme, the
item implies a psychological obtuseness, S does
not consider motivational factors.)
45. Has brittle ego-defense system; has a small
reserve of integration; would be disorgan
ized and maladaptive when under stress or trauma.
46. Engages in personal fantasy and daydreams,
fictional speculations.
47. Has a readiness to feel guilty. (N.B. regard
less of whether verbalized or not.)
48. Keeps people at a distance; avoids close
interpersonal relationships.
49. Is basically distrustful of people in general;
questions their motivations.
50. Is unpredictable and changeable in behavior
and attitudes.
51. Genuinely values intellectual and cognitive
matters.
(N.B. Ability or achievement are not
implied here,)

52. Behaves in an assertive fashion. (N,B. Item 14
reflects underlying submissiveness; this
refers to overt behavior.)
53. Various needs tend toward relatively direct and
uncontrolled expression; unable to delay
gratification.
54. Emphasizes being with others; gregarious.
55. Is self-defeating.
56. Responds to humor.
57. Is an interesting, arresting person.
58. Enjoys sensuous experiences (including touch,
taste, smell, physical contact).
59. Is concerned with own body and the adequacy
of its physiological functioning.
60. Has insight into own motives and behavior.
61. Creates and exploits dependency in people.
(N.B, Regardless of the technique employed,
e.g., punitiveness, over-indulgence.) (N.B. At
other end of scale, item implies respecting
and encouraging the independence and
individuality of others.)
62. Tends to be regellious and non-conforming,
63. Judges self and others in conventional terms
like "popularity," "the correct thing to do,"
social pressures, etc.
64. Is socially perceptive of a wide range of
interpersonal cues.
65. Characteristically pushes and tries to stretch
limits; sees what he can get away with.
66. Enjoys esthetic impressions; is esthetically

reactive.
67. Is self-indulgent.
68. Is basically anxious.
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69. Is sensitive to anything that can be
construed as a demand. (N.B. No implication of
the subsequent response is intended here.)
70. Behaves in an ethically consistent manner; is
consistent with own personal standards.
71. Has high aspiration level for self.
72. Concerned with own adequacy as a person, either
at conscious or unconscious levels.
(N.B. A
clinical judgment is required here; number 74
reflects subjective satisfaction with self.)
73. Tends to perceive many different contexts in
sexual terms; eroticizes situations.
74. Is subjectively unaware of self-concern; feels
satisfied with self.
75. Has a clear-cut, internally consistent personal
ity. (N'.B. Amount of information available before
sorting is not intended here.)
76.Tends to project his own feelings and motivations
onto others.
77. Appears straightforward, forthright, candid in
dealing with others.
78. Feels cheated and victimized by life; self-pitying.
79. Tends to ruminate and have persistent, pre
occupying thoughts.
80. Interested in members of the opposite sex. (N.B,
At opposite end implies absence of such interest.)
81. Is physically attractive; good-looking.
(N.B. The
cultural criterion is to be applied here.)
82. Has fluctuating moods.
83. Able to see to the heart of important problems,
84. Is cheerful. (N.B, Extreme placement toward
uncharacteristic end of continuum implies
unhappiness or depression.)
85. Emphasizes communication through action and
non-verbal behavior.
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86. Handles anxiety and conflicts by, in effect,
refusing to recognize their presence; repressive
or dissociative tendencies.
87. Interprets basically simple and clear-cut situa
tions in complicated and particularizing ways.
88. Is personally charming.
89. Compares self to others. Is alert to real or
fancied differences between self and other people.
90. Is concerned with philosophical problems; e.g.,
religions, values, the meaning of life, etc.
91. Is power oriented; values power in self or others.
92. Has social poise and presence; appears socially
at ease.
93a.Behaves in a masculine style and manner.
93b.Behaves in a feminine style and manner.
(N.B.
If subject is male, 93a. applies; if subject is
female, 93b. is to be evaluated,)(N.B. The
cultural conception is to be applied as a
criterion.)
94. Expresses hostile feelings directly.
95. Tends to proffer advice.
96. Values own independence and autonomy,
97. Is emotionally bland; has flattened affect.
98. Is verbally fluent; can express ideas well.
99. Is self-dramatizing; histrionic.
100.Does not vary roles; relates to everyone in
the same w a y .
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Phenotypic/Genotypic Rating Scale

Directions:
Please read all of the following statements. Each one is
a description of some aspect of personality. Your task is to decide
if a statement is Phenotypic (refers to directly observable behavior)
or Genotypic (refers to underlying behavior, not directly observable).
Indicate with a P or a G which type of behavior each item represents.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

G
G
G
P
P
P
G
G
G
G
P
G
G
G
P
G
P
P
P
P
G
G
G
G
G

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

P
P
G
P
P
G
G
P
P
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
P
P
G
G
G
G
P
G
P

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

G
P
G
P
G
P
P
P
G
G
P
P
P
G
P
G
P
G
G
P
G
G
G
G
G

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

G
P
G
G
P
P
P
G
P
P
G
G
P
G
G
G
P
P
P
P
G
P
P
P
P
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Dynamic, Trait, Interpersonal, and Descriptive Statement Rating Scale

Directions:
Please read all of the following statements. Each one is a
description of some aspect of personality.
Your task is to decide if
a statement is dynamic (refers to underlying, psychological processes
not directly observable), a trait (refers to a stable facet of per
sonality that is not directly observable, but is not a defense
mechanism or dynamic), an interpersonal (refers to behavior involving
interactions with others), or descriptive (refers to observable aspects
of personality that would not involve underlying processes or inter
personal behavior) statements. Mark the letters Dy for Dynamic, D for
descriptive, I for Interpersonal, and T for Trait next to each of the
items when making your evaluation.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

T
T
D
I
I
D
T
Dy
Dy
Dy
I
Dy
T
Dy
I
Dy
I
D
I
D
I
Dy
Dy
T
Dy

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

D
I
I
I
D
Dy
Dy
D
D
I
T
T
I
Dy
Dy
I
D
D
I
Dy
Dy
Dy
I
I
D

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

-

T
D
Dy
I
Dy
I
D
D
Dy
Dy
I
D
D
I
D
T
T
Dy
T
D
T
Dy
Dy
Dy
Dy

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Dy
I
Dy
Dy
I
D
T
D
D
D
Dy
Dy
D
Dy
D
T
I
D
D
I
T
D
D
D
I
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Social Desirability CQ-sort

Directions:

Please read all of the following statements. Each one is a
description of some aspect of personality. Your task is to order the
deck of statements so that the top statement represents the most
social desirable trait, the bottom statement the least socially
desirable trait, and the statements in between would represent all
of the intermediate degrees of social desirability.

—

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

5
9
7
5
8
5
6
8
4
4
7
4
3
4
6
5
8
6
4
6
5
3
2
5
4

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

9
4
7
8
2
6
6
7
3
9
1
1
1
4
3
5
3
6
5
2
4
4
2
2
3

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

7
5
3
6
2
6
8
6
5
7
2
3
5
7
1
6
3
4
4
9
9
5
3
6
7

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

5
8
1
4
7
6
5
8
6
5
2
4
6
5
6
5
7
8
3
5
7
3
7
4
4
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CASE DESCRIPTIONS

Case 1
The subject for case one was an unmarried, white female, 20
years of age. She was a Junior in a State University, working toward
a degree in Speech Therapy. She lived on campus in a dormitory, and
had a steady boy friend. When tested expressly for the purposes of
this study, she had never required treatment and was not then under
treatment. She was described as a popular girl, and was named the
Sweetheart of one of the campus Fraternities.
The judges for the criterion on this case consisted of her boy
friend, a law student, a male from the above mentioned fraternity, and
two Sisters from the subject's Sorority.

Case 2
The subject for case two was a 47 year old, white male, high
school graduate, who was married 21 years. He had one son and worked
as a state civil service employee in the capacity of a duplicating
equipment operator. He was described as a meticulous worker and a
dependable worker by the head of his installation. He was also
described as being highly competent in work that included the opera
tion of multilith presses and the creation of various technical forms.
When tested expressly for the purposes of this study, he had never
required treatment and was not then under treatment.
The judges for the criterion on this case consisted of the
subject's immediate supervisor, a male, a female co-worker, and a
female acquaintance of long standing.

Case 3
A 35 year old white female, who had been married for 20 years
was the subject for case three. She had four children, had a high
school diploma and was working as a secretary for an accountant. At
the time of testing she had been in treatment for 13 months at a
regional mental health clinic because she had been very anxious and
was experiencing difficulties with an alcoholic husband. Her thera
pist described her as being depressed most of the time and hysterical
in character make-up.
The judges on the criterion for this case consisted of four
adults that were acquaintances of the subject.
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Case 4
The subject for case four was a 27 year old white male. He
was in the process of completing a Master's degree in Social Welfare
at a State University. A first marriage had ended in divorce after
four years, and a second marriage at the time of testing was 6 months
old. Before he came to the University he had been in treatment with
a psychiatrist in his home town because of his marital difficulties
concerning sexual competence, self-acceptance etc.
His therapist then
advised continued treatment upon the beginning of graduate school at
a strange place.
The judges for the criterion of this case were two of the
subject's current group therapists, and another therapist who had
treated the subject for one year of individual treatment. All of the
therapists were social workers. They described the subject as being
concerned with his adequacy as a person, highly intelligent and
obsessive-compulsive in character.

Case 5
Case five had as its subject a 64 year old Negro female who
was a patient at a State Hospital for the Mentally 111, for ten years
when
she was tested in conjunction with this study. Before her ill
nessshe had been a school teacher in a large metropolitan city and
had a BA degree. When she was tested she told the examiner that she
was the Sunshine Goddess, Betty Wizard, which of course was not her
given name.
She indicated that she had 22 jobs, 11 of them coming
directly from the President of the United States.
In addition, she
related the fact (in her mind) that she had inherited a huge fortune,
but it had been stolen by attendants on the ward.
The judges for the criterion on this case were a Social Worker,
a Nurse, and an attendant. She (the patient) had worked steadily in
the hospital's beauty parlor, and her supervisor was also used as a
judge .

Case 6
The subject for case six was a white male, 24 years of age.
He completed 8 grades of school, was never married and worked as an
oil field worker. When he was tested he was being held by law at a
State Hospital for the Mentally 111, He had attempted to burglarize
a general store that also had within it a U.S. Post Office, and was
incoherent when apprehended. When he was tested he indicated that he
did hear voices, he was a member of the Mafia, and was also the Son of
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God. Ward personnel described him as being highly volatile, attacked
others without observable provocation and known to have urinated on
other residents of the hospital.
The judges for this case were a Social Worker, a Nurse, an
Attendant and an institutional counselor.
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CONSENSUAL DESCRIPTIONS, FOR THE 4 MOST EXTREME CATEGORIES

Case 1
Most Characteristic
1.

Is critical, skeptical, not easily impressed,

2,

Is a genuinely dependable and responsible person,

81,

Is physically attractive; good-looking,

88.

Is personally charming.

93.

Behaves in a feminine style and manner.

Quite Characteristic
17.

Behaves in a sympathetic or considerate manner,

26.

Is productive; gets things done,

33,

Is calm, relaxed in manner.

35.

Has warmth, has the capacity for close relationships;
compassionate,

28.

Tends to arouse liking and acceptance in people.

70.

Behaves in an ethically consistent manner; is consistent with
own personal standards.

77.

Appears straightforward, forthright, candid in dealing with
others.

92.

Has social poise and presence; appears socially at ease.

Extremely Uncharacteristic
36.

Is subtly negativistic; tends to undermine and obstruct or
sabotage.

37.

Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative, opportunistic.

38.

Has hostility towards others.

49.

Is basically distrustful of people in general; questions their
motivations.

121

73.

Tends to perceive many different contexts in sexual terms;
eroticizes situations.

Quite Uncharacteristic
10.

Anxiety and tension find outlet in bodily symptoms.

23.

Extrapunitive; tends to transfer or project blame.

27.

Shows condescending behavior in relations with others.

39.

Thinks and associates to ideas in unusual ways; has
tional thought processes.

61.

Creates and exploits dependency in people.

62.

Tends to be rebellious and non-conforming.

78.

Feels cheated and victimized by life; self-pitying.

99.

Is self-dramatizing; histrionic.

unconven

Case 2
Extremely Characteristic
2,

Is a genuinely dependable and responsible person

11.

Is protective of those close to him.

12.

Tends to be self-defensive.

13.

94.

Is thin-skinned; sensitive to anything that can be construed
as criticism or an interpersonal slight.
Expresses hostile feelings directly.

Quite Characteristic
1.

Is critical, skeptical, not easily impressed.

20.

Has a rapid personal tempo; behaves and acts quickly.

26.

Is productive; gets things done.

32.

Seems to be aware of the impression he makes on others.
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33.

Is calm, relaxed in manner.

56.

Responds to humor.

69.

Is sensitive to anything that can be construed as a demand.

71.

Has high aspiration level for self.

Extremely Uncharacteristic
3.

Has a wide range of interests.

14.

Genuinely submissive; accepts domination comfortably.

22.

Feels a lack of personal meaning in life.

24.

Prides self on being "objective," rational.

98.

Is verbally fluent; can express ideas well.

Quite- Uncharacteristic
8.

Appears to have a high degree of intellectual capacity.

27.

Shows condescending behavior in relations with others.

28.

Tends to arouse liking and acceptance in people.

37.

Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative, opportunistic.

44.

Evaluates the motivation of others in interpreting

50.

Is unpredictable and changeable in behavior andattitudes.

62.

Tends to be rebellious and non-conforming.

Case 3
Extremely Characteristic
11. Is protective of those close to her,
17.

Behaves in a sympathetic or considerate manner.

68.

Is basically anxious.

82.

Has fluctuating moods.

situations.
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93.

Behaves in a feminine style and manner.

Quite Characteristic
4.

Is a talkative individual.

9.

Is uncomfortable with uncertainty and complexities.

13.

Is thin-skinned; sensitive to anything that can be construed as
criticism or an interpersonal slight.

35.

Has warmth; has the capacity for close relationships; compas
sionate ,

41.

Is moralistic.

56.

Responds to humor,

81.

Is physically attractive; good-looking.

Extremely Uncharacteristic
37.

Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative opportunistic.

36.

Is subtly negativistic; tends to undermine and obstruct
sabotage.

62.

Tends to be rebellious and non-conforming.

65.

Characteristically pushes and tries to stretch limits; sees what
he can get away with.

74.

Is subjectively unaware of self-concern; feels satisfied with self.

or

Quite Uncharacteristic
20.

Has a rapid personal tempo; behaves and acts quickly.

33.

Is calm, relaxed in manner.

52.

Behaves in an assertive fashion.

73.

Tends to perceive many different contexts in sexual terms;
eroticizes situations.

86.

Handles anxiety and conflicts by, in effect, refusing to recognize
their presence; repressive or dissociative tendencies.
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94.

Expresses hostile feelings directly.

97.

Is emotionally bland; has flattened affect,

100. Does not vary roles; relates to everyone in the same way.

Case 4
Extremely Characteristic
2.

Is a genuinely dependable and responsible person.

60.

Has insight into own motives and behavior.

71.

Has high aspiration level for self.

72.

96.

Concerned with own adequacy as a person, either at conscious or
unconscious level.
Values own independence and autonomy.

Quite Characteristic
9.

Is uncomfortable with uncertainty and complexities.

16.

Is introspective and concerned with self as an object.

26.

Is productive; gets things done.

51.

Genuinely values intellectual and cognitive matters.

70.

Behaves in an ethically consistent manner; is consistent with
own personal standards.

75,

Has a clear-cut, internally consistent personality.

80.

Interested in members of the opposite sex,

92.

Has social poise and presence; appears socially at ease.

Extremely Uncharacteristic
37,

Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative, opportunistic.

39.

Thinks and associates to ideas in unusual ways; has unconven
tional thought processes.
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62.

Tends to be rebellious and non-conforming,

86.

Handles anxiety and conflicts by, in effect, refusing to recog
nize their presence; repressive or dissociative tendencies.

97.

Is emotionally bland; has flattened affect.

Quite Uncharacteristic
45.

Has a brittle ego-defense system; has a small reserve of
integration; would be disorganized and maladaptive when under
stress or trauma.

46.

Engages in personal fantasy and daydreams, fictional specula
tions .

49.

Is basically distrustful of people in general; questions their
motivations.

50.

Is unpredictable and changeable in behavior and attitudes.

65.

Characteristically pushes and tries to stretch limits; sees what
he can get away with.

74.

Is subjectively unaware of self-concern; feels satisfied with
self.

78.

Feels cheated and victimized by life; self-pitying.

79.

Tends to ruminate and have persistent, pre-occupying thoughts.

Case 5
Extremely Characteristic
39.

Thinks and associates to ideas in unusual ways; has unconven
tional thought processes.

46.

Engages in personal fantasy and daydreams, fictional specula
tions .

71.

Has high aspiration level for self.

72.

Concerned with own adequacy as a person, either at conscious or
unconscious levels.

90.

Is concerned with philosophical problems; e.g., religious,
values, the meaning of life, etc.
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Quite Characteristic
6.

Is fastidious.

8.

Appears to have a high degree of intellectual capacity.

16.

Is introspective and concerned with self as an object.

24.

Prides self on being "objective," rational.

41.

Is moralistic.

75.

Has a clear-cut, internally consistent personality.

79.

Tends to ruminate and have persistent, pre-occupying thoughts.

98.

Is verbally fluent; can express ideas well.

Extremely Uncharacteristic
29.

Is turned to for advice and reassurance.

62.

Tends to be rebellious and non-conforming.

65.

Characteristically pushes and tries to stretch limits; sees what
she can get away with.

94.

Expresses hostile feelings directly.

95.

Tends to proffer advice.

Quite Uncharacteristic.
18,

Initiates humor.

36.

Is subtly negativistic; tends to undermine and obstruct or
sabotage.

37.

Is guileful and deceitful, manipulative, opportunistic.

38.

Has hostility towards others.

47.

Has a readiness to feel guilty.

67.

Is self-indulgent.

69.

Is sensitive to anything that can be construed as a demand.
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89.

Compares self to others.
Is alert to real or fancied differences
between self and other people.

Case 6
Extremely Characteristic
16.

Is introspective and concerned with self as an object.

39.

Thinks and associates to ideas in unusual ways; has conventional
thought processes.

45.

Has a brittle ego-defense system; has a small reserve of integra
tion; would be disorganized and maladaptive when under stress
or trauma,

46.

Engages in personal fantasy and daydreams, fictional speculations.

50.

Is unpredictable and changeable in behavior and attitudes.

Quite Characteristic
4.

Is a talkative individual.

20.

Has a rapid personal tempo; behaves and acts quickly.

31.

Regards self as physically attractive.

48.

Keeps people at a distance; avoids close interpersonal relation
ships .

49.

Is basically distrustful of people in general; questions their
motivations.

72.

Concerned with own adequacy as person, either at conscious or
unconscious levels.

79.

Tends to ruminate and have persistent, pre-occupying thoughts.

82.

Has fluctuating moods.

Extremely Uncharacteristic
2.

Is a genuinely dependable and responsible person.

29.

Is turned to for advice and reassurance.
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60.

Has insight into own motives and behavior.

75.

Has a clear-cut, internally consistent personality.

83.

Able to see to the heart of important problems.

Quite Uncharacteristic
11.

Is protective of those close to him.

15.

Is skilled in social techniques
and humor.

17.

Behaves in a sympathetic or considerate manner.

26.

Is productive; gets things done.

33,

Is calm, relaxed in manner.

of imaginative play, pretending

61.

Creates and exploits dependency in people.

77.

Appears straightforward, forthright, candid in dealing with
others.

92.

Has social poise and presence; appears socially at ease.

CONSENSUAL Q-SORT CASE 1

No.

Label of Category

9

Extremely Characteristic

88 93 81 *8 *2

8

Quite Characteristic

17 26 35 92 33 70 77 28

7

Fairly Characteristic

56 80

6

Somewhat Characteristic

83 64 58 51 32 14 72 54 43

5

Neutral

98 86 74 21

4

Somewhat Uncharacteristic

3

Fairly Uncharacteristic

87 65 34 40 53 76 97 55 68 100 91 46

2

Quite Uncharacteristic

27 10 39 61 62 23 78 99

1

Extremely Uncharacteristic

49 38 73 36 $7

r

5 19

7 41 84 60 66 29 82 11

9 69 96 *

3 75 57 18 16 44 71

85 79 48 31 30 24 *6 94 47 20

4 13 52 12 15 25 42 50 63 67 89 90 95 45 22

1
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1

CONSENSUAL Q-SORT CASE 2

No.

Label of Category

9

Extremely Characteristic

2 11 12 13 94

8

Quite Characteristic

1 20 26 32 33 56 69 71

7

Fairly Characteristic

5

6

Somewhat Characteristic

4 16 17 18 31 39 45 47 58 60 68 76 77 85 89 96

5

Neutral

4

Somewhat Uncharacteristic

3

Fairly Uncharacteristic

2

Quite Uncharacteristic

8 27 28 37 44 50 62 64

1

Extremely Uncharacteristic

3 14 22 24 98

7 19 34 35 41 63 67 78 82 84 93

21 23 40 43 46 51 53 54 55 70 72 73 79 86 88 90 91 97
6

9 25 29 30 52 61 66 74 75 80 83 87 95 99 100

10 15 36 38 42 48 49 55 57 59 81 92
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CONSENSUAL Q-SORT CASE 3

No.

Label of Category
68 11 17 82 93

9

Extremely Characteristic

8

Quite Characteristic

4 19 41 56

7

Fairly Characteristic

5 47 72 12 42 51 88 90 34 55 10 80

6

Somewhat Characteristic

2 32 57

5

Neutral

98 25 43 66 78 79 96 26 44 50 60 70 89 29 54 84 92 99

4

Somewhat Uncharacteristic

16 h

3

Fairly Uncharacteristic

2

Quite Uncharacteristic

20 33 52 73 97 100 86 94

1

Extremely Uncharacteristic

36 74- 62 65 37

3 63

7

9 13 35 81

8 18 31 76 77 87 95 28 40 45 58 69

61 14 21 24 27 30 46 49 59 83 39 53 64 71
1 15 23 38 67 75 85

6 48 91
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CONSENSUAL Q-SORT CASE 4

No.

Label of Category

9

Extremely Characteristic

2 60 71 72 96

8

Quite Characteristic

9 16 26 51 70 75 80 92

7

Fairly Characteristic

4

6

Somewhat Characteristic

5 11 24 29 31 33 35 44 54 56 57 68 77 83 90 93

5

Neutral

3

4

Somewhat Uncharacteristic

1 10 13 14 15 18 41 42 67 69 73 76 85 87 94 99

3

Fairly Uncharacteristic

20 22 23 27 30 36 40 48 53 55 82 100

2

Quite Uncharacteristic

45 46 49 50 65 74 78 79

1

Extremely Uncharacteristic

37 39 62 86 97

6

8 17 25 32 38 47 52 64 89 98

7 12 19 21 28 34 43 58 59 61 63 66 81 84 88 91 95

CONSENSUAL Q-SORT CASE 5

No.

Label of Category

39 46 71 72 90

9

Extremely Characteristic

8

Quite Characteristic

7

Fairly Characteristic

6

Somewhat Characteristic

2

5

Neutral

3 21 23 31 42 74 45 48 52 59 64 66 76 78 86 88 99 100

4

Somewhat Uncharacteristic

7

3

Fairly Uncharacteristic

1 10 25 34 58 61 63 73 82 81 85 87

2

Quite Uncharacteristic

18 36 37 38 47 67 69 89

1

Extremely Uncharacteristic

29 62 65 94 95

6

8 16 24 41 75 79 98

12 15 17 20 28 32 33 43 91 92 93 96
4

5 11 13 22 26 49 50 51 56 57 68 70 84 97

9 14 19 27 30 35 40 44 53 54 55 60 77 80 83
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consensual

No.

Q-SORT CASE 6

Label of Category

9

Extremely Characteristic

16 39 45 46 50

8

Quite Characteristic

4 20 31 48 49 72 79 82

7

Fairly Characteristic

9 28 38 40 43 52 68 73 80 85 87 94

6

Somewhat Characteristic

8 13 19 34 36 41 42 47 53 59 67 69 76 81 84 86

5

Neutral

6 12 23 27 32 30 52 54 63 65 66 74 88 90 91 93 99 100

4

Somewhat Uncharacteristic

1

3

Fairly Uncharacteristic

10 18 25 35 37 51 64 71 78 89 95 96

2

Quite Uncharacteristic

11 15 17 26 33 61 77 92

1

Extremely Uncharacteristic

3

5

7 14 21 22 24 44 55 56 57 58 70 97 98

2 29 60 75 83
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

4
9
6
4
7
5
7
9
5
2
7
4
4
6
4
6
8
6
7
5
5
4
2
5
4

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

8
2
8
7
5
5
6
8
3
8
1
1
1
2
3
7
4
6
6
4
3
5
5
1
4

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

6
4
3
6
3
7
6
6
5
7
2
2
4
6
3
7
4
3
5
8
6
6
1
5
6

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
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Consensual CQ-sort Case 2
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6
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7
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5
1
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5
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2
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5
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3
3
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51
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72
73
74
75
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4
5
5
3
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5
4
7
6
8
5
8
5
5
4
4

76
77
78
79
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6
6

86
87
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89
90
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95
96
97
98
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100

5
1
4
4
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51
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65
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75

7
2
4
5
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6
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5
4
1
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4
1
5
3
9
6
5
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1
3

76
77
78
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98
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100
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Consensual CQ-sort Case 3
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Consensual CQ-sort Case 4
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Many thanks for consenting to cooperate in this research endeavor.
Below you will find an outline guide to the procedure to use with the
enclosed materials.
THE PROCEDURE AT A GLANCE
STEP

1.

READ instruction sheet,

STEP

2.

EVALUATE the subject's identifying information and
whatever psychological data that is provided

STEP

3.

RATE the personality items in the Q-deck.

STEP

4.

RECORD your ratings.

STEP

5.

FILL-IN the biographical data form.

When you have completed the above steps, MAIL the PERSON
ALITY ITEMS, THE RECORDING SHEET, and the BIOGRAPHICAL DATA FORM.

Sincerely,

Irwin Gadol, M.S.

Joseph G. Dawson, Ph.D.
Professor of Psychology
P.S. Due to the press of time it is necessary to request that an
attempt be made to complete the procedure within two weeks
after receipt of the packet.
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* INSTRUCTIONS
Your task is to describe the personality of an individual, as
accurately as you can, solely on the basis of available data, as it
is provided, WITHOUT ANY FURTHER ALTERATION OR MANIPULATION, using the
100 items on the enclosed cards. Each item consists of a trait or
aspect of personality and you should read the entire set before
proceeding further to familiarize yourself with the content and range
of the items. You are to sort these items into nine categories
ranging from extremely characteristic to extremely uncharacteristic.
The table below lists the number of each category, what it represents,
and the exact number of items that must be placed into each category.
Category No.
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Label of Category
Extremely Characteristic
Quite Characteristic
Fairly Characteristic
Somewhat Characteristic
Relatively Neutral
Somewhat Uncharacteristic
Fairly Uncharacteristic
Quite Uncharacteristic
Extremely Uncharacteristic

No.of Cards
5
8
12
16
18
16
12
8
5

A convenient method of sorting is to form three stacks of cards
- those items deemed characteristic being placed on one side, those
items deemed uncharacteristic placed on the other side, and those cards
remaining, falling in between. No attention need be paid to the number
of cards falling into each of these three groupings at this time. When
the three piles of cards have been established they may be further
graded into the necessary proportions as outlined in the table above.
When you have completed sorting the cards, please re-read the entire
order to make certain they are in the arrangement you intend.
Next, please record the number of each item that you wish to
include in a given category in the labeled boxes of the recording
sheet provided in this packet. To insure that the order of the cards
is preserved, secure the set with the provided rubberband. Next, fill
in the accompanying Clinician's BIOGRAPHICAL DATA SHEET, without pro
viding your name (unless you wish to have a summary of the completed
research mailed to you at a later date).
The procedure is complete when you have mailed the CARDS, the
RECORDING SHEET, and the CLINICIAN'S BIOGRAPHICAL DATA SHEET, in the
self-addressed envelop in the packet. Since the success of this
research depends upon your ratings, please be certain the sorting order
is concise and exactly as you intend it to be. YOUR COOPERATION IN
THIS RESEARCH IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

RECORDING SHEET FOR 100 ITEMS

No.

Label of Category

9

Extremely Characteristic

8

Quite Characteristic

7

Fairly Characteristic

6

Somewhat Characteristic

5

Neutral

4

Somewhat Uncharacteristic

3

Fairly Uncharacteristic

2

Quite Uncharacteristic

1

Extremely Uncharacteristic
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CLINICIAN'S BIOGRAPHICAL DATA SHEET

NOTE:

DO NOT READ THIS SHEET until you have completed the sorting
process and are ready to complete the entire procedure by
providing biographical data about YOURSELF (not the subject).

1.

What is your highest level of education? _______________________

2.

If you possess a degree(s), list the year it was awarded and the
awarding institution(s):

3.

If you are not currently a student, indicate what type of work you
do, your job title, and a short description of your duties:

4.

List the average number of Rorschachs you normally administer on
a monthly basis:

5.

Estimate the number of Rorschachs you have administered since your
first course in the technique:

6.

List the year that you had your first course in the Rorschach
technique:

7.

Do you currently practice therapy? ____________________________

8.

List the number of hours that you would normally devote to the
practice of therapy on a monthly basis;

9.

Indicate if you have ever received therapy, and for what length
of time;
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10.

List your marital status:

11.

If you are married, indicate if you have children and their ages:

12.

Indicate the sibling position you occupy and the number of
children in your original, immediate family (i.e., 2nd of 5
children).

13.

How many of the personality items in this research do you believe
you have placed into correct categories:

14.

Using the five point scale below, and circling one number,
how well do you feel you were able to do in this task?:
VERY WELL
1

_______________________ .

FAIR
2

3

VERY POORLY
4

5

15.

Research shows those judges who have attained high levels of
training tend to be conservative in their estimates, while judges
with less training tend to be over-confident and over-estimate
their efforts. Keeping this in mind, please estimate the number
of items you believe you have placed into correct categories once
again;

16.

What diagnosis do you believe is most appropriate for the subject?:

17.

Indicate the reasons that have (or have not) participated in this
research:

18.

List your name and address below, if you wish to have a follow-up
summary sent to you:

19.

Please write any comments you wish to make on the reverse side of
this page, and thank you for your time and interest.
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